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The Sagebrush Rebellion has been caused by an arrogant attitude
by the Department of Interior land managers, who have refused to
consult and include in their decision-making process State and lo-
cal governments and land users.
James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, 1981-83.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Growing national demand for energy and a desire for energy
self-sufficiency have created strong pressures for a national policy of
accelerated development of petroleum reserves under the outer con-
tinental shelf (OCS). The OCS is defined as those submerged lands
on the continental margins of the United States which are subject to
federal jurisdiction. These lands lie outside the three-mile zone of
coastal submerged lands which are reserved to the states. 2 Acceler-
ated offshore oil leasing began under the Carter Administration and
has continued with significant increases in the pace and magnitude
of lease offerings under President Reagan. Although the specifics of
federal OCS energy development programs may be expected to vary
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1. James G. Watt Nomination - Part 1 Hearings on the Proposed Nomination
of James G. Watt to be Secretary of the Interior Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 78 (1981) (statement of James G. Watt,
See'y of the Interior designate).
2. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1984). A brief description of the geological characteris-
tics and petroleum resources of the OCS is provided as an appendix to this article.
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over time, some form of accelerated development will likely remain
an option whose effects must be carefully considered.
Accelerated OCS energy development, and its profound impli-
cations for the State of Alaska, became a reality with the accelerated
leasing program propounded by the Department of the Interior
(DOI) under President Reagan. The accelerated program was
designed to reduce domestic dependence on foreign energy supplies
through rigorous development of oil and gas resources on the OCS.3
The program contemplated offering for lease nearly one billion
acres of federal OCS lands during the five-year period from August
1982 to June 1987, as compared with fifty-five million acres under
the Carter Administration's proposals.4 This amounts to twenty
times the acreage offered under the Carter plan, and twenty-five
times that offered during the entire period from 1954, when OCS
3. See Final 5- Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental
Shelf. Hearings to Review the Secretary of the Interior's Proposed 5- Year Plan for Oil
and Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf Pursuant to the Outer Continen-
tal Shel Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conserva-
tion and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1982) (statement of James G. Watt, Sec'y of the Interior) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings on the 5- Year OCS Leasing Plan]; Minerals Management
Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (July 21, 1982).
4. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 14
(statement of James G. Watt, See'y of the Interior); Minerals Management Service,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1, 4 (July 21, 1982); Watt Puts One Billion
Acres of United States Coast Up for Bids, Deseret News, July 22-23, 1982, at Al.
The exact size of the United States outer continental shelf has not been deter-
mined. Area estimates provided by the DOI range from about 800 million to over
one billion acres. See OCS Oversight - Part I.: Hearings on Provisions of the
OCSLA Concerning Interrelationships of Federal and State Governments in the Deci-
sionmaking Process and the Importance of the OCS on the Coastal Zone Before the
Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1]. For the purpose of this study, a reasonable
estimate of the federal OCS areas out to a depth of 2,500 meters is about one billion
acres (965.8 million acres). COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (Mar. 26, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES IN LEAS-
ING OFFSHORE LANDS].
"This area is equal in size to roughly half the United States land mass." STAFF
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON THE SECRE-
TARY OF THE INTERIOR JAMES G. WATT's FIVE-YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PLAN
FOR THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]. The OCS is divided into four regions: Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico,
Pacific, and Alaska. IsSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra, at 3-4. These
regions are further divided into planning areas for the purpose of lease sales. Min-
erals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 4 (July 21,
1982). Submerged lands under state jurisdiction are estimated to add 32.7 million
acres. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra, at 3.
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leasing began, to 1980.5 One half of the total land to be offered
under the accelerated program is located within the Alaska OCS.6
The DOI maintains that accelerated OCS leasing is in the na-
tional interest.7 Former Secretary Watt claimed that the program
"will enhance .. .national security, provide jobs, and protect the
environment while making America less dependent on foreign oil
sources. ' 8 The accelerated lease schedule was also advocated as a
means of improving the efficiency of the OCS leasing program and
increasing the availability of critical offshore energy resources. The
Secretary defined the program's major objective as the acceleration
of OCS lease sales9 through a substantial increase in the rate of OCS
leasing, early lease sales in frontier areas with high oil and gas po-
tential, larger lease offerings of entire planning areas, and a stream-
lined pre-sale planning process designed to reduce lead times for
exploratory drilling.'0
The Reagan Administration program was not the first to accel-
erate OCS leasing as part of a national energy program.1' Neverthe-
less, it departed dramatically from past lease schedules.' 2 Although
5. House REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
6. Senate Hearings on the 5- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 21 (state-
ment of James G. Watt, Sec'y of the Interior); Minerals Management Service, U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, News Release 4 (July 21, 1982).
7. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, News Release I (July 21,
1982).
8. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1
(July 21, 1982).
9. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, News Release (July 15,
1981).
10. OCS Oversight- Part 2: Hearings on OCS Oversight and Related Issues, the
National OCS Program, and the Five- Year OCS Leasing Program Before the Sub-
comm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1981) (statement of James
G. Watt, Sec'y of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight Hearings -
Part 21.
11. In response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-1974, President Nixon an-
nounced "Project Independence," a plan by which the United States would seek to
become energy self-sufficient by 1980. In April 1973, as part of an overall strategy
to deal with the nation's energy problems, the President directed the Secretary of the
Interior to triple, from one million to three million acres a year, OCS acreage under
lease. In January 1974, President Nixon instructed the DOI to further accelerate the
pace of OCS leasing from three to ten million acres. Comment, Onshore Impacts of
Offshore Drilling: The Police Power Alternative, 8 Sw. U.L. Rnv. 967 (1976); see also
H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1450, 1483. Some commentators, however, argue that energy indepen-
dence is an unattainable national goal. See, e.g., Chapman, Energy: The Myth of
Independence, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1981, at 11.
12. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1
(July 21, 1982).
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the number of projected OCS lease sales was not increased signifi-
cantly (up from thirty-six to forty in five years), the acreage to be
offered was drastically expanded. The average sale under the Rea-
gan Administration's plan was set at twenty-four million acres, 13 as
compared with 900,000 acres under the Carter Administration. The
accelerated schedule calls for the DOI to offer almost the entire fed-
eral OCS. 14 Previously, the most OCS acreage leased in one year
was 2.2 million acres, in 1981.15
In addition to increasing the acreage for each sale, the Reagan
Administration proposes to increase the total annual acreage offered
for sale. Traditionally, the average annual OCS acreage offered and
leased has been modest. From 1971 through 1980, about 2.9 million
acres of OCS lands were offered for lease annually, and approxi-
mately 1.2 million acres were leased.16 Annual offerings ranged
from 1.8 million acres in 1977 to 7.7 million acres in 1981. By 1983,
projected offerings exceeded 350 million acres. 17
In 1980, only one percent of all OCS acreage was under lease,
only two percent had ever been leased, and less than four percent
had ever been offered for lease.' 8 Through 1982, only twenty-one
percent of the acreage leased had been in frontier OCS regions, that
is, those regions outside the producing areas of the Gulf of Mexico
and the Santa Barbara Channel. 19 At this rate of offshore leasing, it
would take 1,736 years to inventory and lease the oil and gas re-
sources of the United States OCS.20 By comparison, the continental
shelves controlled by the rest of the world are more than forty per-
cent leased.21 As a result, world offshore production in 1981
13. SIERRA CLUB, NATURAL HERITAGE REPORT No. 1, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY:
PUBLIC OIL, GAS, AND COAL AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 6 (Oct. 1982).
14. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, News Release (July
15, 1981); see also GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONSERVATION DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, OUTrER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICS 1953-1980, at 10 (June
1981) (prepared by W. Harris, B. McFarlane & D. Beasley) [hereinafter cited as
OCS STATISTICS).
15. Watt Puts One Billion Acres of U.S. Coast Up for Bids, supra note 4, at Al.
16. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 4, at 30.
17. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 13, at 6.
18. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of W.
Kenneth Davis, Deputy See'y, U.S. Dep't of Energy).
19. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT
SHEET: OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM (July 1983).
20. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 370 (statement of Ar-
thur Spaulding, Vice-President and General Manager, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n);
see also Hedberg, An Emergency Offshore Petroleum Program for the U.S., OIL &
GAS J., Feb. 16, 1981, at 159. Even under the Reagan Administration's increased
rate of leasing, it will take 137 years to evaluate the energy potential of the federal
OCS. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 370.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1214, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1980); Energy: Unlocking
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accounted for twenty-four percent of total world oil production. 22
United States offshore production was 21.7% of total world offshore
production in 1970, but it had fallen to 7.6% in 1980.23
Any program for accelerated development of OCS energy re-
sources will inevitably have profound implications for the State of
Alaska. Although Alaska has historically played a small role in sup-
plying energy for the nation,24 crude oil production at Prudhoe Bay
and future oil and gas development of the Alaska OCS will increase
its importance.25 For at least the next decade, the continental shelf
the FederalLands, 13 GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1981, at 16. "By contrast, the United
Kingdom has offered [the] most and has leased about 40 percent, 52 million acres, of
the acreage it controls in the North Sea." OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra
note 10, at 15 (statement of W. Kenneth Davis, Deputy See'y, U.S. Dep't of Energy).
Canada has leased more acreage in Atlantic waters than the United States has.
Less than 1.4 million acres have been leased in the United States Atlantic compared
to 123 million acres in the Canadian Atlantic. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FIVE-
YEAR LEASING PROGRAM 1 (Sept. 2, 1982).
22. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 7 (statement of Con-
gressman Edwin Forsythe); Figures Relect Offshore Growth, OFFSHORE, June 20,
1982, at 61-62; World Offshore Well Count Shows Strength, OFFSHORE, June 20,
1982, at 47.
The leading producers of offshore oil in 1981 were Saudi Arabia (3 million
barrels per day), the United Kingdom (1.8 million barrels per day), Mexico (1.11
million barrels per day), the United States (1.06 million barrels per day), and Vene-
zuela (1.04 million barrels per day). Figures Reflect Offshore Growth, supra, at 61-62.
These five countries are the major producers of offshore oil. Together, in 1981, they
accounted for 58.6% of the world's offshore petroleum production. World Offshore
Well Count Shows Strength, supra.
23. OCS Oversight -Part 3: Hearings on Provisions of the Proposed Five- Year
Leasing Program and its Impact on Offshore Operations and Examine /sicj the GA 0
Report on the Five- Year Program Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer
Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1982) (statement of J. Robinson West, Ass't See'y for Policy,
Budget, and Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight
Hearings - Part 3]; see also Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the In-
terior, News Release (July 21, 1982).
24. ALASKA OCS SOCIOECONOMIC STUDIES PROGRAM, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WESTERN GULF OF ALASKA PETRO-
LEUM DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS: ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACTS I
(Technical Report No. 38, 1979) (prepared by L. Huskey & W. Nebesky, Institute of
Social & Economic Research, University of Alaska). Through 1974, Alaska had
produced only one percent of the total cumulative petroleum production in the
United States. Id
25. About 95% of Alaska petroleum production in recent years has come from
the Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope. This field is the twelfth largest field ever
discovered in the world and the largest ever discovered in North America. The 10
billion barrels of recoverable oil at Prudhoe Bay make it a "super giant." A "giant"
oil field is defined as containing at least 100 millioi barrels of recoverable oil. Only
about one percent of oil fields are giants. Yet, the super giant Prudhoe Bay field is
100 times larger than a giant. Sustainable Spending Levels from Alaska State
19841
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area surrounding Alaska will be important in federal plans for the
development of new domestic energy resources. 26 Alaska's esti-
mated offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial. The oil
industry maintains that Alaska's OCS is the largest and most prom-
ising offshore frontier for the discovery of petroleum resources in
the United States.27
The potential for significant petroleum discoveries in Alaska's
OCS is partially a result of the immensity of the Alaska continental
shelf. The Alaska continental shelf covers an area of 830,000 square
miles, about seventy-four percent of the total 1,120,000 square miles
of the United States continental shelf.28 This great regional coverage
is a product of the shelf's unique width and Alaska's unusually long
coastline.29 The general coastline of Alaska is about 6,640 miles
long, representing fifty-four percent of the total 12,383-mile general
coastline of the United States.30 The width of the continental shelf is
considerably greater in Alaska than elsewhere in North America. In
the Gulf of Alaska the continental shelf extends two to three hun-
dred miles. By contrast, the average width of the continental shelf
off the Pacific Coast is twenty miles. The average along
Revenues, in 20 ALASKA REVIEW OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, Feb.
1983, at 3 (Institute of Social & Economic Research, University of Alaska).
26. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT
SHEET: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM 3 (Sept. 2,
1982).
27. Alaska Tops in Oil Reserve, OFFSHORE, Feb. 1982, at 64, 69; see also Burke,
Speaking Out: Alaska Holds Key to U.S. Treasure Chest, OFFSHORE, Apr. 1981, at
11; Experts Predict Next Offshore Moves, OFFSHORE, Dec. 1981, at 51, 53; Exxon
Sees Huge Expenditures to Develop Alaska's Resources, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 12, 1982,
at 182; Hanley, Wade & Feldman, Alaska OCS- Game of Giant Fields, OFFSHORE,
Apr. 1981, at 105; Polieiesfor U.S. Offshore Frontier Must Allow Vital Work to Pro-
gress, OIL & GAS J., May 31, 1982, at 41; 1982 Preview: Offshore EditorialAdvisors
Look to 1982, OFFSHORE, Dec. 1981, at 71; Rintoul, High Hopesfor Alaskan Basins,
OFFSHORE, June 20, 1981 at 163.
28. See Figure 1; G. SHARMA, THE ALASKAN SHELF: HYDROGRAPHIC, SEDI-
MENTARY AND GEOCHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 3 (1979); see also J. JACKSON &
F. KuRz, GULF OF ALASKA AND LOWER COOK INLET SUMMARY REPORT 3, at 2
(Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Information Program, U.S. Geological Sur-
vey Open-File Report 82-20, June 1982) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY REPORT].
29. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 28, at 2; see also ALASKA DEP'T OF COMMU-
NITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, DIV. OF COMMUNITY PLANNING, PLANNING FOR
OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT: GULF OF ALASKA OCS HANDBOOK 4 (1978) (pre-
pared by L. Kramer, V. Clark & G. Cannelos) [hereinafter cited as OCS
HANDBOOK].
30. G. SHARMA, supra note 28, at 1; OCS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 7; see
also SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 28, at 2. The tidal shoreline of Alaska (intersec-
tion of high-tide water with the shore) is much longer than Alaska's general coast-
line. Alaska's tidal shoreline is about 47,300 miles long, representing about 53% of
the total 88,633 miles of the tidal shoreline of the United States. G. SHARMA, supra
note 28, at'l.
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Figure 1
MAJOR DIVISIONS OF
ALASKAN SHELF
SOURCE: G. Sharma, The Alaskan Shelf: Hydrographic,
Sedimentary, and Geochemical Environment 3 (1979).
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the Atlantic Coast is forty miles, and in the Gulf of Mexico, sixty
miles.31 Nonetheless, as of 1980 only 0.6% of Alaska's vast OCS area
had been offered for lease, and only 0.2% had ever been leased.3 2
Accelerated OCS energy development will uniquely affect
Alaska not only because of the magnitude of the state's petroleum
reserves, but also because of the special hazards and problems posed
by operations in Arctic and sub-Arctic waters. The Alaska OCS
"encompasses the most hostile and challenging environment that
any offshore driller has likely encountered. ' 33 It is susceptible to a
wide variety of potentially devastating environmental hazards which
"present more severe threats to personnel safety and environmental
protection than the petroleum industry has faced before. ' 34 The
Gulf of Alaska-Aleutian Chain area is one of the most earthquake-
prone areas in the world. Climatic storm conditions in parts of
Alaska's OCS are more violent than those prevalent in the North
Sea. In the Alaskan Arctic, moving pack ice constitutes a serious
hazard to offshore petroleum activities. These hazards will con-
strain offshore oil and gas development and increase the risk of se-
vere oil spills. They will also limit the number of sites available for
offshore exploration and for onshore and offshore facilities, and re-
quire the development of special technology.35
Despite the special problems of operations in Alaska's hostile
environment, the petroleum industry maintains that current techno-
logical capability is sufficient to proceed with exploration and devel-
opment.36 Present technology has been used successfully in similar
marine environments in other parts of the world.37 In addition, the
long lead time before actual production and transportation of oil and
31. OCS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 7, 51.
32. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 4, at 7; see also OCS Over-
sight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 355-56 (statement of John McKeever, Staff
Geologist, Amoco Production Co., Alaska).
33. Burke, supra note 27, at 11.
34. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, I OCS OIL AND GAS - AN ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 13 (Apr. 1974).
35. OCS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 8.
36. Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 4: Hearings Before the Select Comm.
on the Outer Continental Shelf on Oversight on the Outer Continental Shef Lands Act
Amendments of 1978, 96th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 200-06 (1980) (statements of H.L.
Siegele, Vice-President, Production Department, Exxon Co., and Richard Knowles,
District Drilling Superintendent, Alaska District, Atlantic Richfield Co.) [hereinaf-
ter cited as OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 4].
37. Oil companies have successfully operated in the hostile marine environ-
ments of the Beaufort Sea, Upper Cook Inlet, and Gulf of Alaska. Id at 203-05, 397
(statement of Richard Knowles, District Drilling Superintendent, Alaska District,
Atlantic Richfield Co.).
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gas38 will allow the industry to develop further information and
technology, and to implement site-specific mitigation measures. 39
Nevertheless, development of Alaska's OCS energy resources will
carry an especially high risk of oil spills. 40
OCS energy development takes place within a framework of
federal laws, regulations, and procedures, which provide mecha-
nisms designed to mitigate the potentially adverse effects of develop-
ment programs. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)4 1
grants broad authority to the Secretary of the Interior to control
lease operations, including the authority to suspend or cancel any
operation conducted pursuant to an OCS lease or permit if such ac-
tivity presents a threat of serious harm or damage to the environ-
ment.42 The OCSLA requires prospective lessees to submit an
exploration plan and a development and production plan before ex-
ploration, development, and production activities may begin, and
these activities must be carried out in accordance with the submitted
plans.43 The OCSLA also requires the use of the best and safest
available technologies on drilling and production operations." Reg-
ulations require prospective lessees to submit environmental reports
38. The total time required after a lease sale to achieve intitial production is in
the range of four to eleven years, and to obtain peak production requires seven to
fourteen years. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 61-65, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1468-72; NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON OCEAN PETROLEUM RESOURCES, U.S. ARCTIC OIL & GAS 5 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. ARCTIC OIL & GAS]; see also OCS Oversight Hearings -
Part 1, supra note 4, at 358-60 (statement of John McKeever, Staff Geologist, Amoco
Production Co., Alaska); Council Advocates U.S. Arctic Development, OFFSHORE,
Feb. 1982, at 51; Policiesfor U.S. Offshore Frontier Must Allow Vital Work to Pro-
gress, supra note 27, at 41.
39. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS LEASE SALE No. 57, NORTON SOUND 117-20 (Feb. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as SALE No. 57]; see also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE No. 71 DIAPIR FIELD 117-24 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as SALE No. 71]; MINERAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED
NAVARIN BASIN LEASE OFFERING IV-12 to -17 (Mar. 1984); MINERALS MANAGE-
MENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: PROPOSED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE
No. 70 ST. GEORGE BASIN IV-17 to -20 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as SALE No.
70].
40. OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 4, supra note 36, at 203 (state-
ment of H.L. Siegele, Vice-President, Production Department, Exxon Co., U.S.A.);
OCS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 8.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
42. Id § 1334(a)(1)(B).
43. Id §§ 1340(c), 1351(a), (b), (j).
44. Id 1347(b).
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at the same time they submit their plans.45 The environmental re-
port must assess environmental impacts expected to result from im-
plementation of the plans, propose mitigation measures, and discuss
alternatives to the proposed activities.46 The DOI's Minerals Man-
agement Service (MMS) issues orders governing safety and anti-pol-
lution standards for oil and gas lease operations on the Alaska OCS.
These orders address significant safety considerations that could af-
fect OCS facility crews and the environment.47 The MMS may also
mitigate adverse effects by deleting particularly sensitive or other-
wise unsuitable tracts from lease offerings, or by including special
stipulations in the lease agreements.
Despite the existence of such mitigation mechanisms, acceler-
ated OCS development programs and proposals have raised serious
concerns on the part of potentially affected Alaskan interests, partic-
ularly among the commercial fishing industry and among state and
local governments. Alaska's coast has been called "the show place of
the entire earth," 48 and Alaska's waters include some of the richest
marine biological zones in the world.49 Alaskans seek to protect the
beauty of their coastal zone and the profitability of their fishing
grounds from unplanned OCS development. 50
45. 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-3 (1983).
46. Id § 250.34-3 (a)(ii), (b)(ii), (iii).
47. Final Outer Continental Shelf Orders Governing Oil and Gas Lease Opera-
tions on the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,180 (1982).
48. Henry Gannett from the Harriman Expedition of 1898 described Alaska as
follows:
There is one other asset of the territory not yet enumerated; imponderable
and difficult to appraise, yet one of the chief assets of Alaska, if not the
greatest. This is the scenery. There are glaciers, mountains, fiords else-
where, but nowhere else on earth is there such abundance and magnifi-
cence of mountain, fiord and glacier scenery. For thousands of miles the
coast is a continuous panorama. For one Yosemite of California, Alaska
has hundreds. The mountains and glaciers of the Cascade Range are du-
plicated and a thousand fold exceeded in Alaska. The Alaska coast is to
become the show place of the entire earth, the pilgrims not only from the
U.S. but from beyond the seas will throng in endless procession to see it.
Its grandeur is more valuable than the gold or the fish, or the timber, for it
will never be exhausted. This value, measured by direct returns in money
received from tourists, will be enormous; measured by health and pleasure
it will be incalculable.
M. MILLER & P. WAYBURN, ALASKA: THE GREAT LAND 35 (n.d.) (quoting Henry
Gannett).
49. The Alaska coastal zone contains some of the world's most important wild-
life and fish resources. Specifically, the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea regions in-
clude the largest marine mammal habitat in the United States and the most
important bird habitat in the world. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 467 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). For discussion of the interaction of wildlife and oil development in
Alaska, see Wildiffe and Oil: A Survey of Critical Issues in Alaska, in ALASKA PUB-
LIC POLICY: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 241-44 (G. Harrison ed. 1971).
50. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 422-38, 457.
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Coastal states have sought an increased role in the federal OCS
decisionmaking that vitally affects their interests. Indeed, coastal
state and local government concerns sparked discussions of a "Sea-
weed Rebellion"'5 ' comparable to the inland "Sagebrush Rebel-
lion."'52 At a meeting of western governors held in 1981, former
Alaska Governor Jay Hammond commented that the federal policy
of offshore leasing appeared to be "a reduction of states' rights under
the so-called New Federalism" which demonstrated "undue and un-
necessary insensitivity" to coastal states.5 3 Hammond claimed that
unless the OCS leasing schedule was amended it "could do severe
violence to those of us who live in coastal areas."'54 In a letter to the
DOI, he asserted that "the State of Alaska is firmly opposed to both
the magnitude and pace of leasing proposed for the Alaska OCS re-
gion. . ."5. He said that "Alaskans are being asked to shoulder an
inequitable portion of the risks and impacts inherent in oil and gas
activities conducted in hazardous offshore waters. ' 56
Controversy over OCS leasing will heighten in the near future
as the federal government, seeking to promote energy self-suffi-
ciency, accelerates the program to include leasing in previously
unexplored frontier regions. The Alaska OCS provides a unique op-
portunity for examining federal-state relations over the timing and
pace of national energy development. Alaska's coastal waters offer
the greatest potential for significant offshore petroleum discoveries in
the United States.5 7 They also present an extremely hostile offshore
environment for energy development.58 Moreover, petroleum
reserves are not the only resource located within Alaska's coastal
zone. Alaska's waters nurture abundant fish and marine life, includ-
ing some endangered species, and Alaska's coast, among the most
51. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, Salt Lake
Tribune, Sept. 11, 1981, at 2A, col. 3.
52. In recent years the western states have challenged federal ownership of pub-
lic lands within their boundaries through the introduction of "Sagebrush Rebellion
Acts" in state legislatures. These legislative proposals would shift the ownership of
public lands from the federal government to the states. Such legislation was consid-
ered in the following states: Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. Similar legislation has also been filed in the United
States Senate. Backman, Public Land Law Reform - Reflections from Western
Water Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-6.
53. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, supra note
51.
54. Id
55. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 457 (letter from Jay
Hammond, Governor of Alaska, to James G. Watt, Sec'y of the Interior).
56. Id
57. See IssuEs IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 4, at 5; Minerals Man-
agement Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (July 21, 1982).
58. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 467 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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beautiful coastal areas in the world, encourages significant tourist
activity.59
This article examines the major issues arising out of the acceler-
ated development of Alaska's offshore oil and gas resources. While
federal law currently provides some opportunities for coastal state
involvement in leasing decisions, the quality of that state involve-
ment is subject to dispute. The article outlines that dispute and ex-
amines two major conflicts confronting the federal government in its
attempt to accelerate the development of Alaska's offshore oil and
gas resources: (1) opposition from Alaska's commercial fishing in-
dustry, and (2) state and local governments' desire for more deliber-
ate development as well as greater involvement in OCS
decisionmaking.
This article examines the effects of accelerated OCS leasing on
Alaska's commercial fishing industry, discussing the nature and im-
portance of the industry, the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to
protect it, and the measures currently used to mitigate possible dam-
age. Other concerns raised by accelerated OCS development in
Alaska are also discussed. First, the new lease program may not pro-
mote leasing at fair market value. Second, the DOI and the petro-
leum industry may not have the capacity to safely handle the
accelerated program. Third, environmental impact planning under
the new program may be inadequate. Finally, the Reagan Adminis-
tration has proposed the elimination of federal funding for state im-
plementation of coastal programs. The article concludes by
recommending a plan for Alaska OCS development that would min-
imize environmental threats and provide for increased state involve-
ment in OCS planning and decisionmaking.
II. OCS ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMMERCIAL FISHING
INDUSTRY OF ALASKA
In addition to having vast energy potential, Alaska's OCS re-
gion is a fisheries resource of national and international impor-
tance. 60 As a result, potential conflict between the petroleum and
59. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 539-56.
60. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS: A STUDY ON THE FIVE-YEAR
LEASING PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
LANDS AMENDMENTS OF 1982 82 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as OFF-
SHORE OIL AND GAS STUDY]; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, 1 FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY
1982 - DECEMBER 1986, at 146-47, 155-56 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as I FINAL EIS
Supp.]; see also ALASKA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, FISHERIES OF
ALASKA 1981 (July 1982) (prepared by Natural Resources Consultants) [hereinafter
cited as FISHERIES OF ALASKA]; ALASKA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION,
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fishing industries is one of the major issues raised by OCS energy
development. 61 The fishing industry has expressed strong concern
that the economic benefits of OCS energy development may carry a
correspondingly high cost in the form of declining fishery resources
and increased hazards to fishing operations. 62 Energy development
proponents counter by pointing to asserted benefits to fisheries.63
Despite the conflicting positions taken by the two industries, there
has been little scientific research addressing the relationship between
petroleum development and fishing operations in Alaska's OCS.64
A. Importance of Alaska's Commercial Fisheries
Alaska's fisheries are a major part of Alaska's social and eco-
nomic life.65 It is estimated that as much as one-fifth of the state's
adult population is involved either directly or indirectly with the
fisheries sector.6 6 Commercial fishing added over one billion dollars
SEA CHANGE: THE ALASKA SEAFOOD INDUSTRY 1982 (July 1983) (prepared by Nat-
ural Resources Consultants) [hereinafter cited as SEA CHANGE].
61. Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, OFFSHORE, Apr. 1981, at 115. Fisher-
men along the Atlantic coast also have opposed offshore oil and gas activities within
their traditional fishing areas. See Howarth, Oil and Fish: Can They Coexist&,
COAST ALERT 49, 51 (1981); MacLeish, Resources: Oil, Fish and Georges Bank, THE
ATLANTIC, Sept. 1981, at 18; Wilman, OCS Development and Commercial and Rec-
reational Fishing, 5 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 211 (1979); see also Comment, CLF v.
Andrus, and Oil Drilling on Georges Bank: The First Circuit Attempts to Balance Con-
flicting Interests, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 202 (1979).
62. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 94TH CONG.,
2D SEsS., A STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVEL-
OPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE 232 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as EF-
FECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL
ZONE]; Rogers, Off-Shore Oil and Gas Developments in Alaska.- Impacts and Con-
flicts, 17 POLAR RECORD 255, 257 (1974).
63. See, e.g., OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 4, supra note 36, at
396-97 (statement of Richard Knowles, District Drilling Superintendent, Alaska
District, Atlantic Richfield Co.) (drilling operations provide additional employment
to seasonal fishermen and do not impair fish migrations).
64. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 232; see also OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments
- Part 5: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on the Outer Continental Shelf on
Oversight on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands ActAmendments of 1978, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1177 (1980) (statement of Lucy Sloan, Executive Director, National Federa-
tion of Fishermen) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part
5]; Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, 115-16.
65. U.S. ARCTIC OIL & GAS, supra note 38, at 99.
66. ALASKA FISHERIES POLICY: ECONOMICS, RESOURCES, AND MANAGEMENT
4, 5 (A. Tussing, T. Morehouse, & J. Bobbs eds. 1972). The Alaska fisheries sector
includes "harvesting, processing, and distribution; the production of boats, gear,
fuel, and supplies; utilities; repair, port and business services; and the government
agencies responsible for regulation, conservation, management, and development of
the resource of the industry." Id at 4.
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to Alaska's economy in both 1979 and 1980, representing over
twenty percent of Alaska's personal income.67 Thus, "there are few
areas of public policy which generate more passion and public par-
ticipation in [Alaska] than do those associated with the fisheries. '68
The contribution of Alaska's fisheries is significant not only to
the economies of the state and the Northwest Pacific region, 69 but to
the nationaF0 and international7' economies as well. In 1982,
Alaska ranked second nationally in volume of commercial fish and
shellfish landings, accounting for approximately fourteen percent of
the nation's total commercial landings. In 1982 the value of com-
mercial landings in Alaska totaled $576 million, more than double
that of second-ranked California, accounting for twenty-four percent
by value of the national commercial catch.72 During the years from
1979 to 1982, Dutch Harbor-Unalaska and Kodiak ranked among
67. Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, at 115. The wholesale
values of Alaska's commercial catch in 1979 and 1980 were approximately $1.1 bil-
lion. STATE OF ALASKA DEP'T OF FISH & GAME, DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL FISH-
ERIES, STATISTICAL LEAFLET No. 55, ALASKA 1979 CATCH AND PRODUCTION
COMMERCIAL FISHERIES STATISTICS 23 (July 1981); STATE OF ALASKA DEP'T OF
FISH & GAME, DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, ALASKA 1980 CATCH AND
PRODUCTION COMMERCIAL FISHERIES STATISTICS 24 (Feb. 1982).
68. ALASKA FISHERIES POLICY: ECONOMICS, RESOURCES, AND MANAGEMENT 5
(A. Tussing, T. Morehouse & J. Bobbs, eds. 1972).
69. Distant water fishing operations carried out by fishermen from the Pacific
Northwest (Washington and Oregon) in the offshore waters of Alaska significantly
contribute to the Northwest economy. The Alaska contribution is greater than that
of the local fisheries for all sectors of the fishing industry, and is particularly high
among the processing and marketing sector. NATURAL RESOURCES CONSULTANTS,
THE ROLE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE HARVESTING,
PROCESSING, AND MARKETING OF FISH AND SHELLFISH OF LOCAL AND ALASKA
ORIGIN 128-29 (July 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE ROLE OF THE NORTHWEST
FISHING INDUSTRY].
70. The United States commercial fishing industry generates revenues of ap-
proximately $1 billion annually from operations on the Pacific coast (including
Alaska), $715 million on the Atlantic coast, and $554 million on the Gulf coast. The
Catch of the Day - Profits, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1983, at 45.
71. Consumers worldwide depend on Alaska's fish catch. The foreign catch of
fish (excluding tunas) and shellfish in the United States Fishery Conservation Zone
(FCZ) was 1.4 million metric tons (3.1 billion pounds) in 1982. As in previous
years, the United States FCZ off Alaska supplied the largest share (95%) of the
foreign catch. Japan continues to be the leading fishing nation in the United States
FCZ with a catch of 1.1 million metric tons, 76% of the total foreign catch. NA-
TIONAL FISHERY STATISTICS PROGRAM, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FISH-
ERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982, at iv (Current Fishery Statistics No. 8300, Apr.
1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 FISHERIES OF THE U.S.].
72. 1982 FISHERIES OF THE U.S., supra note 71, at v, 4. In 1982, total commer-
cial landings (edible and industrial) by United States fishermen at ports in the 50
states were 6.4 billion pounds and were valued at $2.4 billion. Id at iv, 4.
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the nation's seven leading ports in value of landings; Kodiak ranked
first in 1981, and Dutch Harbor-Unalaska was the leader in 1979. 73
At its seasonal peak, the fishing industry employs more people than
any industry in Alaska other than the government.74
The fishing industry also generates state revenue from taxes and
provides employment to workers in other sectors of the economy. It
is estimated that every hundred jobs in the seafood processing indus-
try creates about twenty-eight additional jobs in other sectors, and
that every hundred dollars of additional income to the processing
sector results in an increase of $184 throughout the economy of
Alaska.75
State revenue collected from taxes and fees levied on the fishing
industry totaled about $28.2 million in fiscal year 1981. This reve-
nue, about 0.8% of total revenue in 1981, appears insignificant when
compared with petroleum revenue, which provided nearly ninety
percent of total collections in the same year.76 Nonetheless, fisheries
revenue was about seven percent of total state non-petroleum re-
ceipts in fiscal year 1981, the third largest behind investment earn-
ings and corporate income tax.77 In any event, simply comparing
state fishing revenues to state petroleum revenues does not provide
an accurate or meaningful measure of the value of the fishing indus-
try to Alaska. In numerous small coastal communities in Alaska,
commercial fishing is the most valuable aspect of the local econ-
ony.78 The aesthetic attraction of the fishing vessels and their oper-
ations contribute to tourism, another important coastal industry.79
Moreover, commercial fishing has important cultural and social val-
ues. Commercial fishing is usually a family operation, and fishing
skills are often passed from generation to generation within a family.
73. Id at 5.
74. ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, HOUSE RESEARCH AGENCY, REPORT 81-4,
THE ALASKA FISHING INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE EXPENDITURES AND
ECONOMIC BENEFITS 1, 5, 35, 41 (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE EXPENDI-
TURES AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS].
75. Id at 6, 49-53.
76. Id at 27.
77. Id at 4, 31.
78. See OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS STUDY, supra note 60, at 89. See generally
ALASKA OCS SOCIOECONOMIC STUDIES PROGRAM, ALASKA OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OFFICE, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
TECHNICAL REPORT No. 30, NORTHERN AND WESTERN GULF OF ALASKA PETRO-
LEUM DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS: COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
(Feb. 1980); INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF
ALASKA, MEASURING THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ALASKA'S FISHERIES (Apr.
1980) (prepared by G. Rogers, R. Listowski, & D. Mayer).
79. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62 at 19.
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Alaska's fishing industry is one of the few remaining independently
owned and operated businesses in the United States. Thus, the loss
of a fisherman's livelihood, and all that it represents, cannot be ade-
quately replaced with alternative employment.80
Finally, the importance of fisheries may be expected to increase
in the future. Unlike petroleum, fisheries represent a renewable and
sustainable source of revenue, income, and employment. 81 Fishery
resources are becoming increasingly important economically, and as
a rapidly expanding world population looks to the oceans as a source
of food, their political significance may increase even more. The
world-wide food crisis may eventually join the present energy crisis
as a dominant international concern. There will then be basic
changes in the comparative economic values of petroleum and food.
In this context, the fishery resources of Alaska will become more val-
uable. 82 It is clear that the importance of Alaska's fisheries warrants
a close examination of the potential problems of accelerated OCS
petroleum development.
B. Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas Development on Alaska's
Fishing Industry
Oil and gas development in waters traditionally used for fishing
sets the stage for conflict between the two industries. For example,
the DOI scheduled OCS lease sales in the St. George Basin and
North Aleutian Shelf areas of the Eastern Bering Sea. 3 These areas
are among the most important fishing grounds in the world. 84 They
account for approximately one-half of Alaska's total domestic
commercial catch of fish and shellfish. Indeed, most of the catch
80. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 43.
81. STATE EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 74, at 1; see
also Rogers, supra note 62, at 273.
82. Senate Hearings on the 5- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 124; Rog-
ers, supra note 62, at 273.
83. The final five-year OCS oil and gas leasing schedule includes four sales in
the St. George Basin and North Aleutian Shelf Basin. They are: (1) 1983, Sale No.
70, St. George Basin; (2) 1984, Sale No. 89, St. George Basin; (3) 1985, Sale No. 92,
North Aleutian Basin; and (4) 1986, Sale No. 101, St. George Basin. The schedule
also includes Sale No. 88 to be held in 1984 in the fishing-rich Gulf of Alaska/Cook
Inlet area. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE
FACTS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING
PROGRAM 9 (July 1983).
84. Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, at 115; see also OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, NAT'L OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PROCEEDINGS AT A SYN-
THESIS MEETING: THE ST. GEORGE BASIN ENVIRONMENT AND POSSIBLE CONSE-
QUENCES OF A MANNED OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT, ANCHORAGE,
ALASKA - APRIL 28-30, 1981, at 114-53 (1982) (prepared by Science Applications,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT].
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taken in North American waters comes from the continental shelf
area,85 the same area within which most offshore petroleum develop-
ment will occur. Almost all of Alaska's salmon catch comes from
within three miles of shore, as does approximately seventy percent of
the value of all Alaska's fish and shellfish landings.86
The economic and social impacts of OCS oil and gas develop-
ment for Alaska's fishermen and coastal communities are potentially
severe87 because Alaska's commercial fishing industry is dependent
upon a few high-valued species. For example, salmon and crab ac-
counted for sixty-eight percent of the volume and ninety percent of
the value of the 1981 commercial landings.88 Reduction of either of
these populations would affect the entire commercial fishing industry
in Alaska. Moreover, conflicts between oil development and fishing
will not be limited to domestic fisheries. International conflict may
arise if foreign fishing is adversely affected.8 9
85. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, 1 STUDY OF OUTER CONTINEN-
TAL SHELF LANDS OF THE U.S. 357 (1968). "It is estimated that total non-shelf
production accounts for no more than ten percent by weight and fifteen percent by
value, most of it consisting of tuna and tuna-like species." Id
86. The Role of the Northwest Fishing Industry, supra note 69, at 15. It would
appear that Alaska could eliminate the potential disruption to its fishery resources
resulting from OCS oil and gas operations because the most valuable offshore zone
to Alaska's fisheries is zero to three miles from shore and this zone is under the
state's jurisdiction. However, OCS petroleum development is not restricted to fed-
eral offshore waters. The exploitation of OCS oil and gas resources involves an
interdependent system of energy facilities of which only part are located on adjacent
coastal states. Thus, the development of OCS oil and gas resources significantly
affects areas under state jurisdiction. See S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-
15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1768, 1778-82.
87. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,
OFFICE OF MARINE POLLUTION ASSESSMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ALASKAN CONTINENTAL SHELF: KODIAK IN-
TERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT - 1980, at 263 (1980) (prepared by Science Applications,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1980 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT].
88. The Role of the Northwest Fishing Industry, supra note 69, at 13-14.
89. B. MORRIS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVING MARINE RESOURCES OF THE
CENTRAL BERING SEA AND POTENTIAL RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COM-
MERCIAL FISHERIES AND PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, PRO-
POSED SALE No. 83, at 213 (NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/AKR-2,
Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN].
As a signatory to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the
United States pledged to develop continental shelf mineral resources in such a
manner as to avoid interfering with continental shelf fishing activities. Article 5 of
the Convention states that "the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploita-
tion of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea .... Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5(1), 15 U.S.T. 471, 473,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 314.
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This section describes the direct and indirect effects of the pro-
posed use of the OCS for energy development. 90 Direct effects, those
arising immediately, include competing demands for use of ocean
space, loss of access to fishing grounds, and damage to fishing gear.91
Indirect effects, those which are not immediately discernible, include
competition for labor and potential changes in the labor force, com-
petition for limited port facilities and industrial infrastructure,
habitat alteration or destruction, and oil pollution. 92
1. Direct Effects of OCS Oil and Gas Development on the Com-
mercial Fishing Industry of Alaska.
a. Vessel collisions. Offshore oil and gas exploration activities
will increase ship traffic in Alaska's OCS areas, causing navigational
hazards. Traffic associated with OCS development includes seismic
exploration vessels, exploratory drilling rigs, platform support ves-
sels, and oil tankers. Crude oil tankers and the additional traffic of
OCS supply and support vessels increase the likelihood of vessel col-
lisions, and, therefore, the risk of injury and oil spills. 93 The effects
of such collisions may range from moderate damage to the complete
loss of one or both of the vessels involved. Complete loss of a vessel
could have a severe impact. Vessel construction companies in the
Pacific Northwest estimate that a catcher/processor vessel costs from
fifteen to twenty million dollars, and that a crabber or trawler vessel
may cost from one to two and one-half million dollars. For every
catcher/processor vessel operating in the St. George Basin there will
be an additional nine trawler or crabber vessels. Under these cir-
cumstances, the estimated average loss due to the sinking of a fishing
vessel is from three to three and one-half million dollars.94 Never-
theless, since most collisions do not result in a sinking, the more
90. See, OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42; EFFECTS OF
OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE, slpra
note 62, at 235.
91. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 235.
92. Id; see also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, 2 FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY 1982 -
DECEMBER 1986, at 682-84 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as 2 FINAL EIS SUPP.]; Cot/licts
May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, at 115, 117.
93. RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, supra note 89, at 215;
see also OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 3. Hearings on Oversight on the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of.1978, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369
(1980) (statement of Paul Wood, Secretary-Treasurer, Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen's Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part
3 ]; OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42; 2 FINAL EIS SUPP., supra
note 92, at 683.
94. ALASKA OCS SOCIOECONOMIC STUDIES PROGRAM, ALASKA OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF OFFICE, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, ST. GEORGE BASIN AND NORTH ALEUTIAN
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likely damage would be much less95 and would be measured in
terms of reparable damage.
The expected incremental number of collisions resulting from
the introduction of OCS vessel activity in the St. George Basin is
relatively lOW,9 6 because the Bering Sea has a relatively modest traf-
fic density compared to many areas of the world.97 Vessel collisions
are infrequent on the high seas. Nonetheless, the increased number
of OCS-related ships represents a potentially serious navigational
problem for traffic close to shore, particularly within harbor facilities
and ports. 98 Moreover, traffic density is only one measure of naviga-
tional safety. Alaska's harsh offshore environmental conditions fur-
ther increase the risk of collision between fishing vessels and OCS
supply and support vessels.99
b. Preemption of fishing grounds. Structures associated with
OCS oil and gas activities may preempt traditional fishing grounds
and thereby reduce fish catches. Fishing space will be lost to off-
shore drilling rigs and platforms, offshore loading facilities, and
pipelines. The extent of territorial loss will depend upon the size,
number, and location of structures as well as the area of required
safety zones. ° The loss of fishing space will continue for the life of
the oil field, which may be twenty-five years or longer. Fishing
grounds also will be lost as a result of the establishment of pipeline
corridors and the expansion or addition of shipping lanes as OCS-
related vessel traffic increases.101 Finally, fishing grounds could be
SHELF COMMERCIAL FISHING ANALYSIS (Oct. 1981) (prepared by Earl R. Combs,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60].
95. Id at 6, 127; see also 2 FINAL EIS SuPP., supra note 92, at 684.
96. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 5, 126-27.
97. ALASKA OCS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES PROGRAM, ALASKA OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF OFFICE, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, NAVARIN BASIN COMMERCIAL FISHING
INDUSTRY IMPACTS ANALYSIS 316 (Mar. 1983) (prepared by Centaur Associates,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82].
98. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42.
99. OCS petroleum development may provide greater vessel safety in the fish-
ing industry. Offshore operations in an area increase the number of vessels and
aircraft available to aid in search and rescue missions when fishing vessels are in
distress or when fishermen need emergency aid. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra
note 97, at 316, 321-22.
100. See OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42. See generally
TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 257-62.
101. RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, supra note 89, at 213-
14; see also OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42; EFFECTS OF
OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE, supra
note 62, at 240, 247.
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destroyed by oil spills, and fishermen might not enter a spill area
because it might foul gear or contaminate their catch. 102
Studies indicate that the catch loss caused by the siting of OCS
structures is negligible for surface structures but much greater for
subsurface structures. 10 3 An increase in the number of subsurface
installations will interfere with Alaska's developing bottomfish in-
dustry. 1°4 The lucrative Alaska bottomfish catch had historically
been taken by foreign nations, 10 5 but the United States' implementa-
tion of a two-hundred-mile Fishery Conservation Zone in 1977 has
encouraged domestic development. 0 6 A heavy concentration of
subsurface installations may preclude bottom fishing in nearby areas
and thus impede the domestic development of an entirely new fisher-
ies industry.10 7
c. Damage to fishing gear. Gear-related problems pose the
most likely ocean space use conflict between the petroleum and fish-
ing industries. Disputes will arise when fishing gear is caught on
subsurface obstructions such as seafioor completions (producing oil
or gas wells), unburied pipelines, exposed well heads, mooring
chains and anchors, and debris.108 Debris deposited on the seafloor
during construction, or discarded by OCS support vessels, may phys-
ically damage the catch itself as well as endanger the safety of the
crew. 10 9 Oil from a spill could coat gear, either destroying it or
102. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 125; see also OCS
Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42.
103. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 268; see also 2 FINAL EIS
Supp. supra note 92, at 683. Surface structures do not significantly reduce catch loss
because they occupy small areas. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 268.
104. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 588.
105. FISHERIES OF ALASKA, supra note 60, at 17-21; see also SEA CHANGE, supra
note 60, at 29-31.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(7), 1802(18) (1982).
107. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 588.
108. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 125. Interaction
between fishing gear and oil and gas structures can cause damage to oil industry
equipment. For illustration, while conducting exploratory drilling in the Bering
Sea, Chevron Oil workers broke a seismic cable after it became entangled with crab
pot gear. It cost the oil company three days of operating time at $50,000 per day to
recover and restore the cable. Therefore, the oil industry has more at stake than the
fear of negative press coverage from fishing gear conflicts. It is good business judg-
ment for the offshore industry to accommodate itself to local fishing operations.
Letter from Hank Pennington, member of Kodiak Island Borough OCS Advisory
Council, to Linda Freed, Planner, Kodiak Island Borough (Aug. 24, 1982) (copy on
file with the author).
109. See EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 240. OCS exploration and development activities
generate waste materials such as scrap metal, piping, cable, empty barrels, and paint
cans. Waste materials are to be disposed of in designated onshore and offshore
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requiring expensive cleaning. Oil-coated fishing gear would also
foul the catch, which would have to be abandoned. '10
A study of gear loss and damage in the St. George Basin esti-
mated that five claims per year would be submitted from fishermen
alleging damage to or loss of their fishing gear as a result of oil and
gas development in 1985, increasing to twelve claims per year for the
year 2000 during full petroleum development in the region; the
claimed value would be about $90,000 in 1985 and $216,000 in the
year 2000 (1980 dollars).1 1 Assuming these figures are accurate,
they "represent a very high loss to individual fishermen." 112 More-
over, these projections do not take into account the value of fishing
time lost while waiting for repair or replacement of damaged gear."I3
The cost of inconvenience and time lost to repair gear is especially
acute in the remote coastal villages of Alaska where replacements
must be shipped from distant suppliers and transportation services
are limited.114
The major fisheries of the Bering Sea use large bottom trawls,
nets and other towed or drifting gear for halibut, and long strings of
pots for crab,"15 all of which are subject to damage as a result of
contact with OCS debris and submerged structures." I6 Loss or dam-
age to trawl gear is a significant problem in the North Sea and the
Gulf of Mexico where major OCS operations coincide with large
trawl fisheries."17 It is projected that in the year 2007, forty-eight
dumping sites but "some supply vessel operators and crews have openly stated that
it's easier to discard material at sea rather than unload it at shore, thereby wasting
valuable shore leave." Id
Full paint containers and large machinery pieces have been found on the ocean
floor in the North Sea. Sutinen, The Potential Impact of Oil Related Debris on the
New England Fishing Industry in NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION, FISHING
AND PETROLEUM INTERACTIONS ON GEORGES BANK, 2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE Two INDUSTRIES, POTENTIAL FUTURE TRENDS, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF
FORESEEABLE CONFLICTS § 9, at 272 (Energy Program, Technical Report 77-1, Mar.
1977) (prepared by Coastal Resources Center, Graduate School of Oceanography,
University of Rhode Island).
110. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 125.
111. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 3-4, 37-43.
112. 2 FINAL EIS Supp. supra note 92, at 683.
113. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 43. A study on the cost of
replacing damaged fishing gear in New England's offshore fisheries estimated that if
a large trawler was forced to return to port for new gear the daily loss in gross
revenue could be $2,000. Sutinen, supra note 109, at 274.
114. 2 FINAL EIS SUPP., supra note 92, at 683.
115. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 40-41. For a summary discus-
sion on the four major fishing methods commonly employed by the U.S. fishing
industry, see PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 373-81.
116. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 281.
117. Id at 302.
1984]
A.ASKA LAW REVIEW
claims will be filed by fishermen in the Navarin Basin alleging trawl
gear damage as a result of oil and gas development. The total loss of
a trawl net and the associated gear may amount to $25,000 for the
type of fishing vessel used in the Navarin Basin. It is unlikely that
trawl gear damage will result in the loss of a complete set of gear.
Generally, nets will be torn and will have to be repaired. Therefore,
the average value of trawl gear loss per incident is estimated at $1800
for loss or damage plus $48,000 per year for lost fishing time.I s
Vessel traffic associated with OCS development will contribute
to the loss of crab pots. Loss of shellfish pots is a significant problem
for crab fisheries operating in areas of high vessel traffic such as
southeastern Alaska and the Cook Inlet. 1 9 Crab pots are used ex-
tensively to harvest king and tanner crab in the Bering Sea and the
Gulf of Alaska. These pots, which may weigh up to 800 pounds, are
placed on the sea floor in depths of up to 150 fathoms. The pots are
connected by a line to a buoy on the ocean surface to mark the loca-
tion. They are set in strings that may run to more than a hundred
pots. Crab pots are lost when the buoys marking their location are
run over by vessels and the lines connecting the buoys to the pots are
cut. The probability of such losses increases when visual detection is
made difficult by poor weather or reliance on radar and autopilot
equipment. 120
2. Indirect Effects of OCS Oil and Gas Development on the
Commercial Fishing Industry ofAlaska. Indirect effects of acceler-
ated OCS development on Alaska's fishing industry include changes
in the labor force, loss of port facilities, destruction of habitat, and
chronic oil pollution. Of these, habitat destruction and pollution are
the major long-term detrimental impacts.
118. Id at 310-12.
119. Id at 281-84. Vessels conducting seismic surveys for the oil industry are
currently the major cause of loss or damage to fixed fishing gear such as crab pots
and set nets. Seismic vessels tow a delicately instrumented cable, which is up to
2,300 meters long, to record the sound waves that are bounced off subsurface rock
formations to reveal folds, faults, sediment thickness, and possible oil deposits. This
cable must be towed along a precise, predetermined course which is usually part of a
huge grid pattern. To prevent the cable from going slack and to keep the proper
depth the vessel must maintain speed, which restricts its maneuverability. To stabi-
lize the seismic cable it is fitted with plastic wings (cable depth controllers) that can
cut or catch the buoy lines on fixed fishing gear and sever the line or drag the traps
off location. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON
THE COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 246-47.
120. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 284, 297-98. It is projected
that 44 crab pots will be lost for every hundred one-way OCS vessel trips to or from
the Navarin Basin. Id at 292-93.
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a. Competition for labor and potential changes in the labor
force. The petroleum industry is unlikely to compete directly with
the fishing industry for labor.121 Fishermen in the harvesting sector
will not transfer to the petroleum industry since fishermen can earn
more in fish harvesting than in the unskilled OCS employment for
which they might qualify. 122 While the processing sector employs
younger, transient people at wages lower than those paid to.unskilled
workers in the oil and gas industry, 123 the demand for unskilled la-
bor in OCS employment is limited, and there is little overlap of re-
quired skills between the OCS and fish processing labor markets. 124
Moreover, most fish processing workers come from outside Alaska
and typically work under six month contracts that include transpor-
tation costs. Thus, the labor pool for fish processing consists of peo-
ple from Alaska and the Pacific Northwest states; in such a large
labor market, the effect of OCS development on labor availability
and wage competition would be minimal. 25
In contrast to its effect on the harvesting and processing sectors,
OCS development will have an adverse impact on competition for
labor in the support industries. Increased OCS activity will increase
demand for the services of skilled technicians such as diesel mechan-
ics, electronic repairmen, and welders. The increased demand for
these services may raise costs and create temporary shortages. 26
In sum, while competition for labor may occur, it appears that
relatively few fishermen will actually transfer into offshore petro-
leum operations. Many workers in the fishing industry, especially
those in the processing sector, will seek OCS employment, but the
number of people who can transfer will be limited by the number of
unskilled OCS jobs available. Greater competition will occur in the
support services labor market, but the overall impact of such compe-
tition is projected to be low. 127
121. See generally TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 272.
122. Id at 278-80; see also TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 5.
123. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 60, supra note 94, at 5.
124. Id at 4-5, 45. For example, it has been projected that by the year 2000 a
total of 9,971 people, most of whom will come from the processing sector, will be
willing to transfer from fisheries to OCS employment in the St. George Basin. Nev-
ertheless, only 101 OCS jobs will be available. Id at 4-5, 84-86.
125. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 279-80.
126. Id at 272.
127. 2 FINAL EIS Supp., supra note 92, at 683. There are some potential benefits
to the labor market of the fishing industry as a result of OCS activity. OCS jobs
may provide supplemental employment when fishing is not in season or when a
fishery is depressed. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 279. OCS-
development also may increase the availability of onshore support services. Cur-
rently, mechanics are transported to port cities like Unalaska and Dutch Harbor for
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b. Competition for port facilities and industrial infrastructure.
Development of Alaska's offshore energy resources combined with
extended fisheries jurisdiction under the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)128 wiR result in increased compe-
tition between the fishing and petroleum industries for existing har-
bor and service facilities. The cost of these facilities to fishermen
will therefore increase. The quality and quantity of onshore services
available to fishermen may also decline.' 29
Unalaska will probably be a major support base for petroleum
industry operations in the St. George Basin. Its port, Dutch Harbor,
has limited waterfront land suitable for development as a service
base or as a tanker terminal, and OCS development would compete
significantly with the fishing industry for available facilities.' 30
Dock space, warehouse and supply yards, living quarters, and other
services could become scarce and more expensive. 31 This is signifi-
cant because Dutch Harbor is consistently among the nation's lead-
ing seafood processing ports. In 1979, it received 137 million pounds
of fish and shellfish, valued at ninety-three million dollars. 32
New port facilities will be required to support offshore explora-
tory operations in the Bering Sea, and in the event of commercial
discoveries, to provide crude oil and liquified natural gas plant sites.
In many areas of the Bering Sea, however, the expansion of facilities
to accommodate ships necessary for OCS oil development is physi-
cally impossible. The coastline of Alaska from Norton Sound to
Bristol Bay has few ports, and "those can only accommodate fishing
boats, shallow draft vessels and barges. For the most part this coast-
line has severe hydrographic limitations and is impacted by seasonal
river ice."' 3 3 Even Dutch Harbor has serious disadvantages as a
support base for Bering Sea petroleum development activities. First,
its remoteness from coastal cities as well as projected OCS develop-
major repairs. Offshore development could create a large enough market to pro-
vide increased support services locally. Id at 272. However, the development of
OCS resident employment could exacerbate competition for housing and other in-
frastructure services. Id at 280.
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
129. RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, supra note 89, at 215;
TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 337, 340-41, 344-45; see also OCS
Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of Lucy Sloan, Executive
Director, National Federation of Fishermen); EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND
NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 242. It is
possible that such displacement could occur in some Alaska ports. Id at 248; TECH-
NICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 341.
130. Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, at 118.
131. RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, supra note 89, at 215.
132. See, e.g., id at 215; see also 1982 FISHERIES OF THE U.S., supra note 71, at 5.
133. Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales, supra note 61, at 117-18.
[Vol. 1:209
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
ment fields will make offshore resupply very costly. Second, al-
though it is the only major ice-free deep-draft harbor in western
Alaska, it is too shallow to accommodate oil tankers.
Where suitable locations may be found, the construction of new
port facilities would be disruptive to the villages within the Bering
Sea region, particularly those of the Aleutian Islands. The extremely
limited infrastructure of western Alaska fishing villages is likely to
be substantially affected if commercial quantities of oil are discov-
ered. The construction of port facilities in isolated fishing villages
would result in a change in lifestyle opposed by many residents.134
c. Habitat alteration or destruction. The Alaska OCS is nearly
pollution-free and historically has experienced minimal human in-
fluence. It supports numerous fishery resources that have evolved
under specific environmental conditions. The Alaska marine ecosys-
tem is highly complex; it contains intricate food webs that are depen-
dent on physical and chemical factors such as salinity, oxygen
content, and temperature. Many marine species may be unable to
cope with sudden habitat changes caused by OCS oil and gas
activities. 135
Energy development may alter or destroy offshore habitats as
a result of platform placement, disposal of drilling muds and
cuttings, 36 pipeline excavation, and construction of causeways to
134. Proposed Five- Year Planfor Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continen-
tal She/ f Hearings to Review the Secretary of the Interior's Proposed Five- Year Plan
for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf Pursuant to the Outer
Continental Shef/Lands Act Amendments Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conserva-
tion and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 69 (1981); EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT
ON THE COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 248; Conflicts May Impede Alaska Sales,
supra note 61, at 117; Rogers, supra note 62, at 269.
135. 1979 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PRO-
GRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORIES, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOS-
PHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
ALASKAN CONTINENTAL SHELF: KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT 80 (1979)
(prepared by Science Applications, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1979 KODIAK INTERIM
SYNTHESIS REPORT]; 1980 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 87, at
103.
136. Drilling muds are special mixtures of clay, water, and chemicals which are
circulated into the drilling hole to cool and lubricate the drill bit, to remove drill
cuttings from the hole, and to prevent blowouts by holding back formation pres-
sures exerted by oil and gas accumulations. Large volumes of drilling muds are
discharged into the marine environment. Drill cuttings, which are shattered and
pulverized sediment and rocks, are dumped directly into the water in the vicinity of
rigs and platforms. 1979 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 135, at
194-95.
There is a difference of opinion about the effect of drilling fluid discharges on
fishery resources. Representatives of the petroleum industry argue that sufficient
research has been done to support a claim that there are no chronic adverse effects
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artificial islands. Onshore habitats may be altered or destroyed as a
result of channel and harbor dredging, road construction, gravel
mining, gravel island construction, improper waste disposal, and
water withdrawal from streams for cooling and processing pur-
poses.137 These activities could render the immediate area incapable
of supporting fish and shellfish species. 138 Furthermore, they may
cause changes in the marine ecosystem that could affect fish migra-
tion and behavior. 139
Potential destruction of wetlands habitat is also a major con-
cern. This potential is illustrated by the effects of OCS development
along the coast of Louisiana, where an estimated five hundred
square miles of valuable wetlands has been lost.140 Wetlands are the
most productive ecosystems of the ocean environment. They sup-
port much of the life in surrounding coastal waters through a food
web based on vascular plant debris. Wetlands also perform a valu-
able geologic function by stabilizing shorelines.
The water quality on which the breeding and spawning of many
commercial species of fish depend may also be adversely affected.' 4'
The destruction of spawning grounds as a result of OCS develop-
ment activity is the major habitat alteration concern in Alaska.' 42
on fish from drilling fluid discharges. Various scientists and resource agency offi-
cials, however, disagree and maintain that the evidence is inadequate to support
such a claim. SALE No. 70, supra note 39, at IV-24 to -26; No OCS Harm Seen in
Mud Discharge, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 21, 1983, at 45.
137. RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, supra note 89, at 216-
17; see also 1980 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 135, at 284. For
a detailed discussion on habitat alteration or destruction due to OCS development
activities, see ALASKA DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, HABITAT DIVISION, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR MINIMIZING THE IMPACTS OF HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT ON THE
FISH, WILDLIFE, AND AQUATIC PLANT RESOURCES OF THE NORTHERN BERING SEA
AND NORTON SOUND (1981).
138. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 588.
139. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of Lucy
Sloan, Executive Director, National Federation of Fishermen).
140. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1768, 1778.
141. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 14.
142. It is obvious why fishing interests are concerned over the potential impact of
OCS oil and gas development on coastal fishing. Coastal waters are five or ten
times more biologically productive than average agricultural lands. Furthermore,
estuaries provide the breeding ground for most of the important commercial fisher-
ies in the United States. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1768, 177 1.
A government report describes the importance of coastal and estuarine waters
to the commercial fishing industry:
Seventy percent of the present United States commercial fishing takes
place in coastal waters. Coastal and estuarine waters and marshlands pro-
vide the nutrients, nursing areas, and spawning grounds for two-thirds of
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Certain coastal areas of Alaska are critical to Alaska's fisheries be-
cause they are important nursery or spawning grounds. Kachemak
Bay, near the mouth of Cook Inlet, is the breeding ground for finfish
and shellfish in Cook Inlet and part of the Gulf of Alaska. Lower
Cook Inlet contains important spawning habitats for herring, 143 and
Bristol Bay is the richest part of the most productive salmon spawn-
ing habitat in the world.44
d Oilpollution. The potential for oil spills into the marine en-
vironment is the greatest ecological threat posed by OCS petroleum
development.' 45 Compared with other marine oil pollution sources
worldwide, offshore oil and gas operations are a relatively minor
source of marine petroleum pollution. 46 Nevertheless, offshore oil
and gas production in Alaska will inevitably result in some escapes
the world's entire fisheries harvest. And these areas may be even more
important for aquaculture in the future, for they are among the most pro-
ductive regions of the world. Most estuarine areas equal or double the
production rates of the best upland agricultural areas; from 15-30 times the
productivity of the open oceans.
S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4776, 4777.
143. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 248.
144. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP., supra note 60, at 155.
145. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 113; 1979 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT,
supra note 135, at 194.
146. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release
(July 26, 1983). Since 1971 the total petroleum lost from United States offshore
production operations, pipeline breaks, and fuel transfers has averaged less than
5700 barrels a year. This nationwide average is much lower than the natural seep-
age of oil from the Coal Oil Point area near Santa Barbara, which dumps 20,000 to
30,000 barrels of oil in the ocean annually. It is also considerably lower than acci-
dental losses from tankers, such as the "Corinthos," which spilled 286,000 barrels of
oil into the Delaware River in 1975, or the "Argo Merchant," which lost over
183,000 barrels of crude oil when it sank off Nantucket in 1976. Id
Since the OCS program began in 1954, approximately 20,000 wells have been
drilled offshore in federal waters. The Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 remains the
only accident in which a significant amount of oil reached the shore. Since the
Santa Barbara blowout, more stringent regulations, worker training programs, oil
spill contingency plans, and strict inspection programs have minimized the chances
of a similar blowout occurring. Since 1970, new drilling technologies and environ-
mental controls have been implemented in United States OCS operations, and more
than four billion barrels of oil have been produced. Nevertheless, as of July 1983,
only 791 barrels were lost due to blowouts. Id; see also EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL
AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 134
(comparing pollution from offshore oil production to that of waste oil disposal);
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of petroleum hydrocarbons into the marine environment. The DOI
estimates that in areas of the Gulf of Alaska where offshore oil and
gas production and commercial fishing must coexist, there will be 3.9
spills of more than a thousand barrels, and 1.7 spills of more than
ten thousand barrels during the lifetime of the OCS leasing
program. 147
Oil spills into the marine environment may result from tanker
accidents, pipeline rupture and spillage, oil well blowouts, and other
operational accidents. 148 The most likely offshore spills are from
blowouts during exploratory drilling. Oil spills during production
and field development are most likely to occur when oil is trans-
ferred from reservoirs to storage or transmission facilities.149
The actual impact of a given oil spill on marine organisms will
vary depending on the magnitude of the spill, the physical and
chemical nature of the oil, climatic conditions, the location of the
spill site, prevailing oceanographic and meteorological conditions,
the time of year, and the cleanup techniques employed. 150 Climatic
conditions are a special concern in Alaska waters because environ-
mental recovery from oil spills in polar regions is slow.' s ' The time
of year during which the spill occurs is important because marine
organisms show natural seasonal variations in their life cycles. For
example, crab larvae, which float near the surface of the water,
would be killed if a spill occurs during that stage of their life
cycles.15 2
There is no conclusive evidence on the long-term effects of a
major oil spill on the marine environment, I5 3 but the short-term
damage from a major spill is undeniably severe. Oil can kill fish
directly - through coating and asphyxiation, poisoning, or destruc-
tion of more sensitive juvenile forms - or indirectly - through, for
example, destruction of food sources, exposure to carcinogens and
OCEAN AFFAIRS BOARD, COMMISSION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: WORKSHOP ON IN-
PUTS, FATES, AND THE EFFECTS OF PETROLEUM ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT,
MAY 21-25, 1973, at 14, 104 (1975) (prepared by the National Academy of Sciences).
147. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP., supra note 60, at 529; 2 FINAL EIS SuPP., supra note 92,
at 565, 591, 619.
148. 1979 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 135, at 194.
149. See EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON
THE COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 120-21.
150. See id at 117-20, 147-48; see also ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT,
supra note 84, at 125.
151. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 119.
152. Id; see also ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at xii.
153. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 113; see also 1980 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS
REPORT, supra note 87, at 89.
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mutagens affecting survival and commercial value, and incorpora-
tion of low levels of oil.154
Laboratory studies are used to predict the impact of petroleum
on marine organisms. 155 Research has been conducted on the effects
of oil on the biochemical, physiological, and behavioral responses of
Alaskan fishery species.' 56 These studies, however, were conducted
under controlled conditions that may not be entirely applicable to
natural environments. 57 Nonetheless, these studies show that oil
contamination of the Alaska marine ecosystem may significantly
harm commercially important fish species. 158 The species most vul-
nerable to oil pollution are those that inhabit the ocean surface layer
or the shallow areas near shore sometime during their life cycles.
These species include salmon, herring, crab, and shrimp.159 They
have free-floating eggs and larvae that float at or near the ocean sur-
face until metamorphosis when they return to the ocean bottom to
154. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 113; see also D. PIMLOTTI, D. BROWN & K. SAM,
OIL UNDER THE ICE 98 (1976); ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note
84, at xii-xiii, 125, 153. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 5
OCS OIL AND GAS - AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT (Apr. 1974). For a discussion on the potential effects of oil spills on fish popu-
lations, see ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 130-38.
The following is a brief description of the potential impact of an oil spill on the
Georges Bank fisheries:
The impact of an oil spill on [the fishery] resource [of the Georges Bank]
might be devastating. The oil would kill directly almost all planktonic fish
eggs and larvae in its path, many benthic organisms residing on or near the
ocean floor, and some portion of actively swimming fish, depending on
the as yet undetermined ability of the last to avoid the contaminated area.
Furthermore, among the species of fish whose spawning grounds are most
exposed to the danger are those, such as haddock, already threatened by
overfishing. A severe oil spill could destroy the New England haddock
fishery by lowering the schools below the point of recruitment failure, or
irreversible depletion. Even without this lethal long-term effect, which
could remove from mankind's use for all time a resource of incalculable
worth, the loss of even a particular year class of fish would cause substan-
tial economic damage.
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1979).
155. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,
OFFICE OF MARINE POLLUTION ASSESSMENT, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ALAS-
KAN CONTINENTAL SHELF: NORTHEAST GULF OF ALASKA INTERIM SYNTHESIS RE-
PORT 104 (July 1980) (prepared by Science Applications, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as
NORTHEAST GULF OF ALASKA INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT].
156. 1980 KODIAK INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 87, at 136.
157. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 113.
158. Id at 247.
159. 1 FINAL EIS SUPP., supra note 60, at 534.
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feed and grow to maturity. 60 Eggs and larvae are particularly vul-
nerable to oil contamination. 16'
Salmon and herring are the Alaska commercial fish most sensi-
tive to oil pollution. 62 During certain seasons, oil spills could criti-
cally affect salmon resources. For example, spilled oil may alter the
timing of salmon migration. "Any change in the timing of arrival of
juveniles to feeding grounds or adults to spawning habitats may re-
sult in migrations away from optimal conditions and greatest
chances for survival."' 163 Pacific herring, like salmon, are extremely
sensitive to the presence of crude oil.164 Crabs are also particularly
vulnerable to oil exposure at several points of their life cycles. 165
"Failure to find food, inappropriate responses to environmental
stimuli, failure to find mates, and change in time of spawning could
result in significant declines in crab and shrimp populations. ' 166
Oil in the marine environment may not only harm fish species,
but also may make them unfit for human consumption. Tainting,
the presence of an objectionable oily taste or odor in fish as a result
of oil contamination, is of great concern to fishermen because tainted
catches are often refused. 167
C. The Secretary's Duty to Protect the Fisheries
The Secretary of the Interior has a legal duty to protect Alaska's
fisheries while overseeing the development of OCS oil and gas
resources. The Secretary's duty arises from case authority, the
OCSLA, the FCMA, 168 the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 169 the common law public trust doctrine, and interna-
tional agreement.
In Massachusetts v. Andrus,170 the Secretary of the Interior and
160. SALE No. 70, supra note 39, at IV-26.
161. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at xii.
162. Id
163. Id at 128; see I FINAL EIS Supp., supra note 60, at 534; D. PIMLOTTI, D.
BROWN & K. SAM, supra note 154, at 98.
164. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 128; see also 1
FINAL EIS Supp., supra note 60, at 536.
Areas suitable for the deposition of their adhesive eggs are critical for suc-
cessful herring spawning. Herring eggs are deposited on gravel substrate,
or on kelp and eelgrass along the shoreline. If these habitats are impacted
by oil, herring may avoid using these areas, or if the areas are used, the
reproduction success may be reduced.
EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL
ZONE, supra note 62, at 248.
165. ST. GEORGE BASIN SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 128.
166. Id at 154.
167. Id at 128, 154.
168. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
[Vol. 1:209
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
intervening oil companies appealed from an order of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts preliminarily
enjoining the Secretary from proceeding with the proposed sale of
oil exploration leaseholds in the New England OCS.' 7' The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the grounds for the prelimi-
nary injunction and found them insufficient to justify a continuing
injunction. 72 The court, however, went beyond the immediate issue
of the injunction to hold that the OCSLA imposed upon the Secre-
tary of the Interior a duty to protect the fisheries while performing
his other obligations under the statute. The court of appeals stated
clearly that:
[B]oth past and present versions of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act place the Secretary under a duty to see that gas and oil
exploration and drilling are conducted without unreasonable risk
to the fisheries. His duty includes the obligation not to go forward
with a lease sale in a particular area if it would create unreason-
able risks in spite of all feasible safeguards. 173
The court of appeals specified that the essential factors in deter-
mining whether the Secretary has met his duty to protect the fisheries
are whether he has provided all feasible safeguards and, if so,
whether the remaining risk to the fisheries is unreasonable. These
factors are to be considered at the time of the sale.174 Even if the
Secretary has provided all feasible safeguards, his duty requires him
not to conduct the lease sale if the risk to the fisheries remains unrea-
sonable. The risk to fisheries is unreasonable if OCS development
activities would result in irreparable harm to a fishery. 175 Thus, "if
the threat is relatively small, and the damage posed to fishing of no
major consequence, the Secretary may determine that leasing should
proceed even if some harm may result."'176
The primary source of the Secretary's duty to protect the fisher-
ies is the OCSLA. The statute must "be construed in such a manner
that the character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as
high seas and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be
170. 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979). In this dispute the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts and conservation groups were concerned about the commencement of off-
shore oil drilling in Georges Bank - a region described in the final environmental
impact statement as "one of the most productive fishing grounds in the world." Id
at 874. The state and environmental groups focused attention on the "conflicts
between oil drilling and fishing and on concerns about the possible impact of oil
contamination on the aquatic and onshore environment." Id at 874; see also id at
881-82.
171. Id at 873, 880-81.
172. Id at 887.
173. Id at 889.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id
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affected."' 77 The statute also provides that "the Secretary may at
any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he de-
termines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the pre-
vention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the
outer continental shelf."' 78 The court of appeals in Massachusetts v.
Andrus interpreted that language as requiring the Secretary to regu-
late oil and gas activities so as to harmonize the competing interests
in the various resources of the OCS. The court further concluded
that the language commanded the Secretary to consider the interests
of the fisheries, reasoning that the word "may" in a statute can be
treated as imposing a duty where the statute confers a power to be
exercised for the benefit of the public. Thus, the court felt that "the
provision implied an underlying duty to exercise due diligence that
the resources [fisheries] be in fact protected."' 79
Section 1334(a) of the OCSLA directs the Secretary to prepare a
five-year leasing schedule, setting forth guidelines and procedures
for such preparation. 80 Management of the program must consider
the economic, social, and environmental values of the renewable and
nonrenewable resources of the OCS, and the potential impact of oil
and gas exploration on these values.' 8 ' Furthermore, the Secretary
must consider other uses of the sea and seabed, including fisheries, 8 2
and "the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity
of different areas of the [OCS]' 183 when he determines the timing
and location of lease sales. Thus, decisions as to the timing and
location of lease sales must be based, in part, on factors which re-
quire the Secretary to consider the interests of the fisheries, and the
potential impact upon them from OCS development.' 8 4
The OCSLA includes several provisions establishing environ-
177. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2) (1982).
178. Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrews, 623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st Cir.
1979); see also North Slope Borough v. Andrews, 486 F. Supp. 332, 350 (D.D.C.
1980).
179. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 890.
180. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
181. Id § 1344(a)(1).
182. Id § 1344(a)(2)(D). This section requires the Secretary to consider the loca-
tion of the various regions "with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed -
including fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential sites of deep-
water ports, and other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the [OCS]"
when he determines the timing and location of lease sales. Id; see also California
v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1309-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
183. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(G) (1982); see also California v. Watt, 668 F.2d at
1307-08, 1311-13.
184. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2) (1982).
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mental safeguards and remedial procedures. They include an Off-
shore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 185 a Fishermen's
Contingency Fund,186 authorization to suspend or cancel leases
where a severe and long-lasting threat to the environment is found to
exist,187 and mandatory use of the best available and safest technol-
ogy in all new OCS drilling operations. 88 These provisions indicate
that the Secretary of the Interior must consider and protect other
offshore resources while exploiting OCS oil and gas resources.'8 9
The provisions establish specific methods for minimizing or elimi-
nating conflicts with other offshore resources.' 90 Thus, the OCSLA
indicates that, although Congress sought to expedite exploitation of
OCS oil and gas resources, 19' it also intended to avoid serious dam-
age to "the renewable resources of the Outer Continental Shelf
which are a continuing and increasingly important source of food
and protein to the Nation and the World."' 192
The Secretary's duty to protect the fisheries was reinforced by
the enactment of the FCMA. A major purpose of Congress in pass-
ing the statute was to promote domestic commercial fishing by prop-
erly conserving and managing continental shelf fishery resources.'
93
Although the Department of Commerce rather than the DOI is re-
sponsible for implementing the FCMA, 94 the Act reflects a strong
commitment to the protection of OCS fishery resources, equaling the
commitment to oil and gas development that is reflected in the
OCSLA. 195 Thus, the Secretary of the Interior must give equal con-
sideration to the policies of both the FCMA and the OCSLA to
185. Id §§ 1811-1824.
186. Id §§ 1841-1847.
187. Id § 1334(a).
188. Id § 1347(b).
189. One of the congressional purposes in enacting the OCSLA Amendments
was to "minimize or eliminate conflicts between the exploration, development, and
production of oil and natural gas, and the recovery of other resources such as fish
and shellfish." Id § 1802(7).
190. In passing the OCSLA, Congress declared:'
[B]ecause of the possible conflicts between exploitation of the oil and gas
resources in the Outer Continental Shelf and other uses of the marine envi-
ronment, including fish and shellfish growth and recovery,... the Federal
Government must assume responsibility for the minimization or elimina-
tion of any conflict associated with such exploitation.
Id § 1801(13).
191. Id §§ 1332(3), 1802(1).
192. Id § 1801(14); see also id § 1802(2).
193. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), (3) (1982).
194. Id § 1802(20).
195. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 891. The Andrus court noted:
The [FCMA] is thus no less an assertion of a federal interest in conserving
the fishery resources in the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf than was
the earlier Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act an assertion of a federal
interest in developing the oil and gas wealth of the subsoil and seabed in
the same area.
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minimize the possibility of conflict between them.196 Such conflict
can best be resolved not be giving offshore mineral development ab-
solute priority over coastal fisheries, but rather by balancing the in-
terests in the two resources in such a manner that the fisheries would
not be harmed seriously by the development of OCS oil and gas
resources. 197
The Secretary's duty to protect the fisheries is further supported
by the provisions of NEPA. NEPA expresses a national commit-
ment to the intelligent use of all our natural wealth, which requires
responsible federal officials to balance the benefits to be gained from
the exploitation of one resource against the possible harm that may
accrue to others. 198
Similarly, the Secretary's duty to protect the fisheries is in ac-
cord with the public trust doctrine. This doctrine is based on the
common law concept that the Secretary of the Interior is the guard-
ian of the people of the United States and therefore is bound to see
Id
The fishery resources found off the coasts of the U.S. had been overfished by
large international fishing fleets for a number of years. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3)
(1982). The severe depletion of fish stocks was a major factor in Congress's decision
to enact the FCMA in order to regulate coastal fishing activities and thereby allow
the fisheries to return to normal levels of productivity. Id § 1801(a)(5)-(6); see also
Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (Ist Cir. 1977).
196. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 891; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1802(7)
(1982).
197. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 891. The court stated: "A construc-
tion [of the FCMA and OCSLA] allowing oil and gas exploitation to take absolute
priority over fishing would be to sanction a schizophrenic national policy, in which
one hand was busily at work undoing what the other was seeking to accomplish."
Id
198. Id The federal government's environmental policy is set forth in NEPA:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly
the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization,
industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding tech-
nological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of re-
storing and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Fed-
eral Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and
other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of pres-
ent and future generations of Americans.
43 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (1982).
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that none of the public domain is wasted. 199 The doctrine embodies
the principle that the federal government is the trustee of certain nat-
ural resources with the obligation to preserve those resources for the
benefit of its citizens.2°° The public trust doctrine is expressly incor-
porated into the OCSLA. The Secretary has the power "to provide
for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources
of the [OCS]. ''201 The grant of such powers to the Secretary indi-
cates that he has a duty to protect the fisheries, a duty consistent with
the longstanding public trust doctrine. 20 2
Finally, the Secretary has a duty to protect the fisheries under
international agreement. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, to which the United States is a party, states that the
exploitation of continental shelf natural resources "must not result in
any unjustifiable interference with. . . fishing or the conservation of
the living resources of the sea."'203
D. Mitigation Measures
,The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary to prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to minimize possible injury to
the environment. 2°4 Pursuant to this authority, the Minerals Man-
agement Service (MMS) enforces OCS safety, environmental, and
conservation laws and regulations by issuing OCS orders, lease stip-
ulations, lease notifications, and other information.20 5 Lease stipula-
tions included in a notice of sale may define specific precautions
necessary for exploration and production activities in a particular
199. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 890; see also Hannifin v. Morton, 444
F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1971).
For discussions on the public trust doctrine, see generally Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in NaturalResources Law.- Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv.
473 (1970); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: 4
Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1980); Note, California's Tideland Trust: Shor-
ing It Up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (1971); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine Expan-
sion and Integration: 4 Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211
(1983); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
200. United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1978).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982); see also Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d
786, 804 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
202. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 890.
203. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5(1), 15 U.S.T. 471,
473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 314.
204. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
205. Final Outer Continental Shelf Orders Governing Oil and Gas Lease Opera-
tions on the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,180 (1982), reprintedin
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ALASKA OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF ORDERS GOVERNING OIL AND GAS LEASE OPERATIONS
(Nov. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALASKA OCS ORDERS].
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area.206 In addition to the stipulations, the MMS may issue notices
to lessees that define operational problems and prescribe necessary
actions. Notices to lessees often add to stipulations, but they may be
separate and distinct from previous regulations. 20 7
The DOI has implemented several measures designed to mini-
mize the loss of fishing gear resulting from tangling with petroleum-
related structures and equipment, the most widespread hazard to
fishing operations from OCS oil development. 20 8 Alaska OCS Order
No. 1 requires labeling of all subsea objects and equipment used on
rigs, platforms, and supply vessels on the OCS which might be lost
overboard, so that responsibility for any resultant damage may be
determined. Any hazardous object that is lost must also be reported
and described to the United States Coast Guard.20 9 Stipulation No.
3 for OCS Lease Sale No. 70 (St. George Basin) requires that subsea
wellheads and temporary abandonments, or suspended operations
that leave protrusions above the seafloor, must be protected so as to
206. See, e.g., MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
NOTICE OF SALE, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE No. 70,
ST. GEORGE BASIN 18-21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NOTICE OF SALE]; see also
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d at 595-96.
207. An example of a Notice to Lessee (NTL) is NTL No. 83-4 which imposes
the following restrictions on preliminary activities on leases within the St. George
Basin:
1. Seismic surveys are limited to surveys using high resolution sys-
tems.
2. No seismic surveys may be conducted on leases within 20 miles of
Unimak Pass between April to June 30 and October 1 to December 31.
3. Whenever the seismic survey is firing its seismic energy sources,
the lessee must have one person looking for whales. The lookout must use
standard field binoculars (7 power 35mm). No seismic energy sources may
be fired if a gray or right whale is within the lookout's range of vision.
4. When a vessel is operated near a concentration of whales, the
operator must take every precaution to avoid harassment of these animals.
Therefore, vessels should reduce speed within 300 yards of whales, and
those vessels capable of steering around such groups should do so. Vessels
may not be operated in such a way as to separate members of a group of
whales from other members of the group.
5. Vessel operators should avoid multiple changes in direction and
speed within 300 yards of whales. In addition, operators should check the
waters immediately adjacent to a vessel to ensure that no whales will be
injured when the vessel's propellors (or screws) are engaged.
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL No. 83-4,
NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES IN THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, ALASKA OCS REGION (May 27, 1983) (notice im-
poses certain restrictions on preliminary activities on leases within the St. George
Basin).
208. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of Lucy
Sloan, Executive Director, National Federation of Fishermen).
209. 47 Fed. Reg. 47,180 (1982); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.54 (1983); TECHNICAL
REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 315.
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allow commercial trawl gear to pass over without snagging or other-
wise damaging the structure or the fishing gear. Stipulation No. 3
further requires that all pipelines, unless buried, must have a smooth
surface design. If an irregular pipe surface is unavoidable because of
the need for valves or other structures, it must be protected in such a
manner as to allow trawling gear to pass over the object without
snagging or causing other damage.210
Stipulation No. 2 for Lease Sale No. 70 requires environmental
training for all oil and gas personnel in order to acquaint them with
the value of the St. George Basin fishery, the techniques employed
by fishermen, and general precautions regarding multiple use of the
waters and seafloor. The Fishermen's Contingency Fund provides a
mechanism for compensating fishermen who suffer damages and
economic loss as a result of OCS energy development.21'
A number of other mitigating measures could be implemented
by the DOI to reduce fishing gear damage. Trawl gear damage can
be reduced by mandatory seafloor inspection and cleanup. A study
conducted by the government of Norway found that the majority of
ocean debris is located within fifty to seventy meters of an offshore
drilling site. This conclusion led to regulations requiring seafloor in-
spection and cleanup within a precise distance of North Sea OCS
drilling sites.212 Similar regulations in the United States would re-
duce damage to fishing gear, especially trawl gear. The most effec-
tive measure to reduce crab pot loss would be to designate special
corridors routing OCS vessels around areas of high crab pot concen-
tration. Fishing activities could be prohibited within designated
OCS corridors. Pot loss would be further reduced if OCS vessel op-
erators were informed of high concentrations of crabbing operations
so that they could be avoided entirely.213
Private sector measures also may minimize conflicts between
fisheries and energy development. Representatives of several major
oil companies and the major fishing and processing organizations
operating in Alaska formed an inter-industry organization, the Oil/
Fisheries Group of Alaska. The Group's purpose "is to provide a
forum for inter-industry communication, education, and resolution
of potential problems relating to operations in Alaska. A goal is the
successful co-existence of commercial fishing, processing, and oil in-
dustry activity in Alaska offshore areas. ' 214 The Oil/Fisheries
210. NOTICE OF SALE, supra note 206, at 19.
211. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1847 (1982).
212. TECHNICAL REPORT No. 82, supra note 97, at 315. Norway has initiated an
extensive program to clean up significant offshore areas of concentrated debris. Id
213. Id at 299.
214. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALASKA OIL AND FISHING INDUSTRIES, A MAN-
UAL FOR GEOPHYSICAL OPERATIONS IN FISHING AREAS OF ALASKA app. C-1 (1983)
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Group of Alaska prepared A Manualfor Geophysical Operations in
Fishing Areas ofAlaska to be used by oil companies and the fishing
industry in order to avoid operating conflicts. The manual was pre-
pared in response to concern expressed by the fishing industry that
seismic vessels might interfere with fishing and processing opera-
tions. This approach to conflict avoidance at sea stresses informa-
tion exchange and communication both before and during the
conducting of seismic programs.2 5 The Oil/Fisheries Group of
Alaska is a program initiated by private industry to deal with com-
mon problems without government assistance. It represents a
unique attempt by the two industries to successfully coexist as they
exploit natural resources from the same ocean areas.
E. Summary
Portions of Alaska's coastal waters are among the world's most
productive marine environments. Consequently, these areas are
among the most intensively harvested fishing grounds in the
world.216 The Alaska OCS also may be a rich energy resource for
the United States.217 It is therefore understandable that conflicts
have occurred and undoubtedly will continue to occur between the
petroleum and fishing industries over the development of Alaska's
OCS energy resources.
Alaska fishermen do not want to completely prohibit OCS oil
and gas development. They do want more time to prepare for the
consequences of such development and to study the impacts of off-
shore production.218 Commercial fishermen are large consumers of
(available through Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., Pouch 6-612, Anchorage, AK
99502).
215. Id at 1. The purpose of the geophysical manual is to provide:
1. Basic information to geophysical operators on the fishing industry
in the Bering Sea, Kodiak Island area and Lower Cook Inlet so that pro-
gram planning and operations at sea can avoid or minimize potential con-
fficts with fishing operations;
2. A systematic (voluntary) approach for geophysical program plan-
ning and marine operations that involves communications with the fishing
industry prior to and during seismic operations;
3. Basic information to the fishing industry on the characteristics of
seismic operations (equipment, techniques, etc.) and contact points in the
oil and &eophysical industries to enable the fishing industry to assist in
communication and conflict avoidance.
Id at 3.
216. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 232, 246-47.
217. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1982 ANNUAL EN-
ERGY REVIEW 33 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 ENERGY REVIEW].
218. OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 5, supra note 64, at 117 (state-
ment of Lucy Sloan, Executive Director, National Federation of Fishermen); EF-
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petroleum products, and they recognize the importance of reducing
United States dependence upon foreign oil by increasing domestic
production. Nonetheless, they "are very concerned about rushing
into a domestic development plan at the risk of a renewable resource
that feeds people all around the globe and provides jobs [for]
thousands of Americans. '2 19 Fishermen question a policy that ig-
nores potential harm to fisheries, a renewable resource, in order to
obtain the short-term benefit of OCS oil and gas development.220
The DOI's environmental impact statement on the five-year leasing
program states that the loss to individual fishermen in Alaska from
OCS development activities could be severe as a result of the new
leasing schedule.221
The OCSLA was enacted, in part, "to balance orderly energy
resource development with protection of the human, marine and
coastal environments."2 22 Nowhere in the terms of the OCSLA, or
its legislative history, did Congress express an expectation that OCS
oil and gas leasing would take place under conditions, or in particu-
lar locations, where serious and permanent damage to the environ-
ment or other important resources would result. The Act does not
mandate exploitation of oil and gas resources at the expense of other
important resources.223 The Secretary's power to enter into oil and
gas leases is discretionary. He may withhold from leasing those
areas in which offshore drilling operations would not be in the public
interest because they are too dangerous to the marine environ-
ment.22 4 There is "no evidence that Congress sanctioned the de-
struction of a fishery as an acceptable price for oil and gas
development. 22 5 To the contrary, the OCSLA places the Secretary
under a duty to see that oil and gas exploration and drilling are con-
ducted without unreasonable risk to the fisheries. "His duty includes
the obligation not to go forward with a lease sale in a particular area
if it would create unreasonable risks in spite of all feasible safe-
guards." 226 Considering the high biological productivity of Alaska's
OCS, the potential vulnerability of its ecosystems to petroleum de-
velopment and oil pollution, the potential for conffict between the
FECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL
ZONE, supra note 62, at 240-41, 248-49.
219. OCS Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 5, supra note 64, at 117 (state-
ment of Lucy Sloan, Executive Director, National Federation of Fishermen).
220. EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE, supra note 62, at 242.
221. 2 FINAL EIS SuPP., supra note 92, at 684.
222. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(2)(B) (1982).
223. Id §§ 1332(3), 1802(2).
224. Id § 1337; see also id § 1334.
225. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (Ist Cir. 1979).
226. Id
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fishing and petroleum industries, and the undeniable importance of
Alaska's fisheries for future generations, the need for petroleum re-
source development must be carefully weighed against the long-term
risk of harming renewable fishery resources.
III. OTHER CONCERNS RELATED TO ACCELERATED
OCS DEVELOPMENT
Alaska has little of the social and governmental infrastructure
found in other areas of the United States that are subject to OCS
development. Alaska does not have sufficient time under the accel-
erated OCS lease schedule to plan and provide for needed facilities
and social services. The leasing program proposed by former Inte-
rior Secretary Andrus provided an average planning time of twenty-
six months for sales in the Gulf of Mexico and up to forty-one
months for Alaska sales. These time frames reflected not only the
different environmental characteristics of the two offshore regions,
but also their differing degrees of infrastructure development.
Under the current leasing program, however, sale planning steps will
be completed in about twenty-one months in both regions.
227
The accelerated OCS leasing program was hastily developed
and does not adequately address these concerns. The Comptroller
General reviewed the accelerated OCS oil and gas leasing program
prepared by Secretary Watt and concluded:
[R]edesign of the leasing program appears to have been done
within Interior with little or no input from other Federal agencies
and only minor consideration of input from the public sector. The
new program reflects the Administration's policy decision to accel-
erate mineral leasing more than it reflects the comments received
through the public participation and review process .... 228
227. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PITFALLS
IN INTERIOR'S NEW ACCELERATED OFFSHORE LEASING PROGRAM REQUIRE AT-
TENTION 11, 13 (Dec. 18, 1981) [hereinafter cited as PITFALLS]. The leasing program
under Secretary Andrus provided 30 months to plan for a sale in the Pacific OCS
region and 31 months to plan in the Atlantic. Id at 13.
228. Id at 28; see also GAO: OCS Leasing Plan is Too Much, OIL & GAS J., Jan.
11, 1982, at 44. For the DOI's view on PITFALLS, see OCS Oversight Hearings -
Part 3, supra note 23, at 12-13 (statement of J. Robinson West, Ass't Sec'y of Policy,
Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). Previous attempts by the DOI to
accelerate OCS leasing also have not been well planned. The Comptroller General
characterized Interior's 1974 plan to lease 10 million OCS acres as "the most critical
policy decision in the 20-year history of Federal Shelf Leasing; one which deserved
careful analysis and consideration." COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL GOALS TO
ACCELERATE LEASING OF OIL & GAS RESOURCES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF 4 (Mar. 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as OUTLOOK].
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The DOI conducted few studies assessing the potential impact of the
OCS program.229 In particular, the DOI did not evaluate the new
program's potential impact with respect to (1) industry competition
and small company participation in OCS lease sales, (2) the ability
of state and local governments to participate in OCS decisionmak-
ing, (3) the use and impact of alternative bidding systems, (4) long-
term revenues to the federal government, and (5) the impact on the
economy.230
The need to generate revenues to reduce the federal budget defi-
cit was a major consideration in developing the accelerated OCS
leasing schedule.23' The Office of Management and Budget en-
couraged the DOI to pursue an aggressive OCS leasing program as
an important revenue enhancing measure,232 and DOI spokesmen
have acknowledged the contribution the OCS program makes in
raising revenues for the Treasury.2 33 Indeed, federal revenues re-
ceived from OCS oil and gas development activities are second only
to income tax revenues as a source of income for the United States
Treasury. Revenues from OCS development activities have totaled
almost fifty-eight billion dollars from the beginning of the federal
OCS program in 1954 through the end of 1982. Total revenues for
the entire five-year program through 1987 are estimated to be ninety
billion dollars. 234
When the Comptroller General analyzed the 1974 plan, however, he found that
the proposal was:
-hastily conceived by Interior under pressures exerted by the pres-
ence of the energy crisis and fears that the newly formed FEA would as-
sume responsibility for the Shelf leasing program;
-developed with little input by the operating levels of BLM and
[USGS] and based on overly optimistic assumptions and inadequate data;
-adopted by Interior policy officials despite opposition from pro-
gram personnel in BLM and [USGS]; and
-developed and adopted without considering environmental im-
pacts, national-regional supply-and-demand needs, or alternatives to
large-scale expansion of Shelf leasing.
Id
229. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 47.
230. Id at 38, 47-48.
231. Id at 23; see also OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 316;
HousE REPORT supra note 4, at 55; Jennrich, U.S. Oilmen Supporting Reagan, But
Some Fear Broken Promises, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 58. This is not the first
time that the OCS program has been used to generate revenues for the federal gov-
ernment. In the 1970's, "the needs of the Bureau of Budget (now the OMB) dic-
tated when and where to lease. The shelf oil-and-gas leasing program was heavily
influenced by the desire to generate revenues for the [federal] Treasury." OUTLOOK,
supra note 228, at 6.
232. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 22; see also Palmer &
Kelly, Government Praisedfor Policy Changes, OFFSHORE, June 20, 1983, at 35, 38.
233. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 96 (statement of J.
Robinson West, Ass't Sec'y for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
234. Palmer & Kelly, supra note 232, at 38.
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Richard Delaney, Assistant Secretary of Environmental Affairs
and Director of the Coastal Zone Management Program in Massa-
chusetts, has charged that the main goal of the OCS leasing plan is,
in fact, to collect revenue to offset the federal budget deficit. 235 Bar-
bara Heller, consultant to the Environmental Policy Center, testified
before a House Subcommittee that the most disturbing underlying
assumption of the accelerated leasing schedule is that economics is
the only governing force in the development of OCS oil and gas re-
sources. She stated: "I don't recall anything in the OCS Act that says
OCS resources are to be sold to help balance President Reagan's
budget. It sounds like Napoleon selling the Louisiana Territory to
pay for his wars." 236
Accelerated OCS leasing raises four principal concerns in addi-
tion to the problems already discussed. First, the accelerated leasing
schedule will not promote leasing at fair market value. Second, the
DOI and the petroleum industry may not have the ability to manage
and execute so vast a program. Third, environmental impact assess-
ments will be less detailed under the new program. Finally, propos-
als to reduce or eliminate federal funding for ocean and coastal zone
management programs, at the same time oil and gas leasing is accel-
erated, threaten to seriously limit state and local governments' ca-
pacity to provide the necessary infrastructure and cope with the
impacts of the leasing program.
A. Fair Market Value
The OCSLA requires that the leasing program be prepared and
maintained in accordance with the principle that "[1]easing activities
shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market value for the lands
leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government. ' 237 The
accelerated leasing schedule floods the marketplace with large lease
offerings and changes the bid acceptance procedures formerly used
to determine fair market value. These changes will reduce competi-
tion on individual tracts, reduce federal government revenues below
235. Outer Continental She/f Lease Sales and the Dep't of the Interior's Five-Year
Leasing Plan - Part 2: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. of Interior & Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st and
2d Sess. 324 (1981) (statement of Richard Delaney, Chairman, New England/New
York Coastal Zone Task Force) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings - Part 2].
236. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 161 (statement of Bar-
bara Heller, Consultant, Environmental Policy Center).
237. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982); see also Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200,
202 (10th Cir. 1971); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Watt, 517 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (D.D.C.
1981).
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levels considered adequate under past practice, and lease OCS re-
sources for less than fair market value.238
The OCSLA bases its leasing program 239 on the premise that
competition will provide a fair market value for the OCS tracts
leased. 240 The level of competition in the lease market may be as-
sessed in terms of the number of participating companies, the per-
centage of tracts receiving bids, the average dollar amount bid per
acre, and the average number of bids per tract.24' The last item,
average bids per tract, has been a source of concern in several OCS
sales. The Comptroller General has repeatedly concluded that com-
petition is inadequate to assure receipt of fair market value when
forty-nine percent or more of the tracts receiving bids receive only
one or two bids.2 42 The accelerated leasing schedule, with its ex-
panded lease offerings, will increase the number of tracts receiving
single bids. "The large number of tracts expected to receive only one
and two bids is an indication that sufficient competition does not
exist for the government to receive fair market [prices] for much of
the [OCS] acreage leased. ' 2 43 The DOI itself has recognized that its
OCS program will result in more tracts receiving fewer bids:
It is likely that substantially expanded leasing will result in lower
bids on average and perhaps lower bids for some tracts than they
would bring under a more restrictive leasing program .... Ex-
panded lease offerings are also likely to result in more tracts
receiving only I or 2 bids and perhaps even in fewer bids on the
better prospects. 244
In addition to flooding the marketplace with lease offerings, the
accelerated OCS program changes the evaluation procedure that the
238. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 50; see also House Hearings - Part 2, supra
note 235, at 519-22 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.).
239. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(9)(1) (1982).
240. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE No. 35- PROBLEMS SELECTING & EVALUATING LAND
TO LEASE 30 (Mar. 7, 1977) [hereinafter cited as SALE No. 35].
241. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFSHORE
LEASE SALE 59 AFFECTED BY DIFFERING VIEWS ON OIL & GAS POTENTIAL 4 (Mar.
4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as SALE No. 59].
242. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE No. 40- INADE-
QUATE DATA USED TO SELECT & EVALUATE LANDS TO LEASE 27 (June 28, 1977);
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, GEORGIA EMBAYMENT - ILLUSTRATING AGAIN THE NEED FOR MORE
DATA BEFORE SELECTING & LEASING OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS 10
(Mar. 19, 1979).
243. House Hearings -Part 2, supra note 235, at 521 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
244. 2 FINAL EIS SUPP., supra note 92, at 859.
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DOI used in the past to determine whether the bids received consti-
tuted fair market value.2 45 Under the traditional procedure, eco-
nomic, geological, and engineering data on the sale area were
gathered before each sale. A detailed economic evaluation was pre-
pared from this information for every tract offered for lease,246 and a
minimum acceptable bid for each tract was determined prior to the
sale. After the sale, industry bids were compared with the presale
tract evaluations, and only those bids meeting or exceeding the
DOI's values could be accepted.2 47
This detailed analysis slowed leasing of OCS tracts. Recogniz-
ing that it would be impossible to perform a detailed analysis on
every tract offered in the accelerated program, the DOI changed the
tract evaluation procedure. Under the new evaluation procedure,
tracts will no longer be evaluated before a sale. Instead, bids will be
analyzed after they are received, through a two-phase evaluation
process that relies heavily on the marketplace to determine fair mar-
ket value.248
In phase one of the new process, the tracts receiving bids are
separated into three categories. These categories are (1) tracts re-
ceiving nonprospective bids,2 49 (2) tracts where opportunities for
strategic underbidding, information asymmetry,250 collusion, and
other noncompetitive practices might occur and where the govern-
ment has the most detailed and reliable data, and (3) tracts where
competitive market forces can be relied upon to assure fair market
value.25' Within these categories, high bids on all tracts classified as
drainage and development tracts252 will be referred directly to phase
two for further evaluation. All legal high bids on nonprospective
tracts will be accepted. After anomalously low bids have been
screened out, high bids will be accepted for any prospective tract that
receives three or more bids, or that receives more than the average
number of bids on prospective tracts in the entire sale, or for which
245. House Hearings - Part 2, supra note 235, at 522 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
246. Id at 523.
247. SALE No. 59, supra note 241, at 10.
248. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 52; see also SALE No. 59, supra note 241, at
10-11.
249. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 52. Nonprospective tracts are those in
which oil and gas probably do not exist, or from which oil and gas are not economi-
cally recoverable. Id at 52 n.146.
250. Id at 52. Information asymmetry is the advantage of having more informa-
tion than other bidders. Id at 52 n. 147.
251. Id at 52.
252. Id Development and drainage tracts are located near tracts with proven
production. They are given more detailed analysis because holders of nearby tract
leases may possess more information than other bidders. Id at 52 n.148.
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the geometric average bonus bid 253 for the tract is in the upper 50th
percentile for those prospective tracts receiving bids.254
All bids which are not accepted under the phase one criteria will
undergo a more detailed analysis in phase two. This analysis wil be
the same as that performed on all tracts under the old procedure.
The DOI estimates that approximately fifty-five percent of the bids
on prospective tracts will be accepted in phase one of the new evalu-
ation procedure.255
This new procedure will facilitate accelerated leasing which will
in turn result in a short-term increase in annual revenues to the fed-
eral government. This increase, however, may be offset by future
long-term losses to the Treasury. The Sierra Club has calculated
that the Treasury will lose approximately $76.89 billion in OCS lease
revenues if all the remaining United States oil and gas reserves are
leased under the procedure developed for the accelerated OCS pro-
gram.256 The depression of bid levels below fair market value will
result in a loss of $53.5 billion over time.257 The new bid evaluation
procedure will cost taxpayers an additional $23.4 billion.258 Even
the DOI calculates that the accelerated OCS program could cost the
public five billion dollars in lost revenues through 1987.259
Another major area of economic concern is the cost-benefit
analysis underlying the accelerated scheduling of sales. In formulat-
ing the timing of individual lease sales, the DOI considered only the
value of expected petroleum resources in 1982, giving no considera-
tion to the change in value of those resources over time.260
In essence, [the] Department of the Interior's approach to leasing
is to immediately dispose of any of those resources which have
any value at all .... This methodology ignores the obvious fact
- that any rational owner of resources would recognize - that
delaying the disposition of resources until sometime in the future
253. Id at 52. A geometric average bonus bid is the mean of all bids on a tract.
Id at 52 n.149.
254. Id at 52. For an overview of tract bid procedures, see MINERALS MANAGE-
MENT SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY,
INCLUDING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE OCS FAIR MARKET VALUE TASK FORCE
(Mar. 1983).
255. Id Part 2, at 5.
256. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 13, at 14; see also House Hearings - Part 2, supra
note 235, at 532 (statement of Carl Pope, Ass't Conservation Director, Sierra Club);
Id at 580-83 (DOI's response); OCS Lease Plan Seen Costing U.S. $77.28 Billion,
OIL & GAS J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 114.
257. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 13, at 8.
258. Id at 12.
259. House Hearings -Part 2, supra note 235, at 114 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
260. Id at 527-28.
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is economically preferable if the value is expected to rise suffi-
ciently in the interim.26 1
In calculating the costs and benefits of delaying lease sales, the DOI
assumed a one percent annual real price increase. This low rate of
increase significantly underestimates the benefits of delaying certain
lease sales, including those in Alaska.2 62
The accelerated OCS program decreases competition in the
lease market; nevertheless, the DOI is placing increased reliance on
that market to assure receipt of fair market value for the disposal of
publicly owned resources. 263 In fact, large acreage offerings and in-
creased sale frequency may produce a non-competitive market.264
The possible effects of the current accelerated leasing plan can be
inferred from the results of a previous attempt in 1973 to accelerate
OCS leasing. In that instance, competition declined as the acreage
offered increased. The current accelerated leasing program, like the
one in 1973, may significantly reduce competition for OCS tracts. 265
Furthermore, the acceleration of leasing will occur at a time when
the market for petroleum products is soft. The worldwide glut of oil
and gas depresses the demand for OCS leases and reduces the return
the public receives for these resources.2 66
Coastal states do not receive funds directly from federal OCS
lease activity. Nonetheless, states benefit indirectly when public re-
sources are sold for their true value; selling them at a lower price
would be inconsistent with a national fiscal policy devoted to balanc-
ing the budget and lowering taxes. Indeed, the accelerated OCS pro-
gram has been characterized as "the most monumental giveaway in
the Nation's history. ' 2 6 7
261. Id at 527.
262. Id at 528. The one percent figure was taken from the low growth range
prediction of a study done by the Resource Consulting Group (RCG). RCG deter-
mined that the most likely growth rate was 2.5 to 3.5% per year. Id The Depart-
ment of Energy predicted a three percent growth rate. Id at 528-29. At a three
percent rate, it is beneficial to delay leasing in six lease areas of offshore Alaska that
have sensitive resources. Id at 529 n.l.
263. House Hearings -Part 2, supra note 235, at 519 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
264. SALE No. 35, supra note 240, at 14.
265. NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., IST SESs., AN ANALYSIS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S PROPOSED ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT
OF OIL AND GAS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 4-5, 17-25 (Comm. Print
1975).
266. Senate Hearings on the Five- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 8
(statement of Senator Howard Metzenbaum).
267. Id
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B. The DOI's Ability to Manage the Accelerated OCS Program,
and Industry's Capacity to Explore One Billion Offshore
Acres
1. The DOI's Ability to Administer the OCS Program. The
OCSLA requires the DOI to estimate for Congress the money and
full-time permanent positions needed to support a revised or new
leasing schedule.2 68 The DOI estimated that it can administer the
accelerated leasing program with forty-two million dollars less than
was estimated in the June 1980 lease schedule prepared by former
Secretary Andrus (a 5.6% reduction), and with 948 fewer full-time
positions (an eleven percent reduction). While reducing its budget
and staff, the DOI will be offering more offshore acreage through
accelerated OCS lease sales than it has in the past, primarily in fron-
tier areas. The DOI has not explained how reductions of program
funding and staffing and implementation of the accelerated leasing
schedule will be accomplished simultaneously. 269
The adequacy of the DOI's staff and funding to administer the
accelerated OCS program is open to question. The Comptroller
General questioned whether the DOI's funding and staffing esti-
mates reasonably predict OCS program needs. In his opinion, given
the accelerated leasing program, funding and staffing needs for the
OCS program will likely exceed current projections if the program
goals are to be achieved.270
2. Industry's Capacity to Explore One Billion Offshore Acres.
The new leasing program may exceed the petroleum industry's ca-
pacity to explore and develop new OCS lands.271 The history of
OCS development shows that the petroleum industry has been, and
probably will continue to be, slow in developing the offshore lands it
leases. A report by the Energy Action Foundation, surveying the
worldwide lease holdings and production rates of twenty major oil
companies, found that the companies increased their holdings of un-
developed oil and gas lands by over forty-eight million acres (forty-
three percent) from 1976 to 1980, but increased their acreage in pro-
duction by only 682,000 acres (2.5%). In 1976, the twenty major oil
companies had twenty-four acres in production for every hundred
acres held inactive. In 1980, the number of acres in production had
declined to seventeen for every hundred acres leased but not produc-
ing.272 As of 1981, the oil industry had leased only three percent of
268. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1982).
269. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 38, 40.
270. Id at 43.
271. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 277.
272. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 62.
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the Alaska, California, and Atlantic OCS land initially considered
for lease, and many tracts that the industry did not explore and de-
velop were returned to the federal government. 273
Few studies have analyzed the petroleum industry's capacity to
handle the accelerated leasing program. The DOI sees no need for
such studies. Secretary Watt maintained that the availability of OCS
lease offerings should not be determined by industry's capabilities. 274
Nevertheless, a report for the Center for Environmental Education
(CEE) concluded that future OCS development will be constrained
by a shortage of available mobile offshore drilling rigs, a lack of
qualified personnel, the limits of oil and gas technology, and a
shortage of capital.275 According to the CEE report, the offshore oil
and gas industry does not now have, and will not have by 1987, the
capacity to explore and develop the OCS lands offered under the
accelerated leasing program. 276
The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, criticized the
CEE findings. The GAO concluded that the petroleum industry is
fully capable of increasing its offshore activities, although the exact
level of the increased activity is uncertain. It maintained that the
level of increased participation will depend more on the economics
of oil development and the predictability of the leasing schedule
than on the magnitude of OCS lease offerings.277 The offshore pe-
troleum industry also claims that it has the capacity to increase its
activities to meet the accelerated leasing schedule.278
273. R. TINNEY, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION: CAPABILITIES AND CON-
STRAINTS 5 (Center for Environmental Education, 1981); see COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMD-81-59, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOP-
MENT 45 (Mar. 26, 1981); see also GAO: Industry Diligent on Federal Leases, OIL &
GAS J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 129; cf. Government Charges of Operator Footdragging on
Federal Leases Exposed as False Issue, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 107 (the
industry has been diligent in exploring and developing leased lands).
There are 117,000 oil and gas leases on federal onshore lands totaling 100 mil-
lion acres but only six million acres are in production. Furthermore, between 75%
and 80% of federal onshore leases expire without the submittal of drilling proposals.
OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 7 (statement of Congressman
John Burton). For a discussion on the diligence of industry exploration of federal
onshore oil and gas leases see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMD-82-82,
ARE LEASEHOLDERS ADEQUATELY EXPLORING FOR OIL AND GAS ON FEDERAL
LANDS? (Aug. 23, 1982).
274. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 55.
275. R. TINNEY, supra note 273, at 5.
276. Id at 46.
277. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 50. See generally id at 50-64.
278. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 363-69 (statement of
Charles Matthews, President, National Ocean Indus. Ass'n); OCS Oversight Hear-
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C. Quality of Environmental Planning
Although the petroleum industry may be able to increase its off-
shore operations to keep pace with the new leasing schedule, it may
not be able to do so in an environmentally safe manner. With the
industry's resources spread over vast offshore areas, the quality of its
performance may deteriorate. 279 Coastal states are concerned that
the DOI lacks the personnel and funding to effectively administer
the accelerated lease schedule.280
Under the accelerated OCS program, an areawide environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS) will be prepared for the first sale in a
planning area to assess the effects of all oil and gas activity that
might occur there. The EIS will examine the environment of the
entire planning area and consider the nonpetroleum-related activi-
ties which may be endangered by offshore oil and gas activities. The
EIS will identify alternatives to the proposed development, including
the deletion of environmentally sensitive areas and the development
of mitigating measures.281 It will emphasize the aggregate impact of
OCS oil and gas activity that would occur if all the hydrocarbon
resources in the planning area were developed. The EIS will assess
expected cumulative effects and analyze the effects the DOI believes
will occur from the initial sale under study. Under the areawide EIS
concept, the DOI will have an early start on the environmental anal-
ysis since it will not have to wait for the identification of specific
tracts as has been necessary in the past.
The EIS prepared for subsequent offerings in a planning area
will update the initial areawide EIS. This concept is called
"tiering. ' 282 The update will include the results of ongoing environ-
mental studies and monitoring projects as well as information from
ings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 32 (statement of E.A. Wardwell, Chairman, Na-
tional Ocean Indus. Ass'n); id at 39 (statement of Paul Kelly, Corporate Vice-
President, Zapata Corp., on behalf of Int'l Ass'n of Drilling Contractors).
279. OCS Oversight Hearings- Part 1, supra note 4, at 319 (position of Gover-
nor Jay S. Hammond on the current federal OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Schedule for
the period 1980-1985); OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 21-22
(statement of Congressman Leon Panetta).
280. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 38-49.
281. Id at 17-18; see also Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department
of the Interior's Five- Year Leasing Plan - Part 1: Hearings on the Outer Continental
Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's Five- Year Leasing Plan Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 33-34 (1981-1982) (statement of John
Fields, Acting Manager, Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land
Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings-
Part 1].
282. Tiering involves sequential preparation of environmental impact statements
from a broad, programmatic to a lesser or site-specific scope. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.28 (1983). For a discussion on the tiering of impact statements prepared on
OCS lease sales, see Comment, The Tiering of Impact Statements - Can the Process
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any new exploration activities. Each subsequent EIS will be shorter
and will take less time to prepare than the initial areawide EIS.283
The DOI believes this change complies with NEPA regulations
which encourage agencies to tier their environmental impact state-
ments to eliminate repetitive discussion and analysis.284
The areawide EIS will preclude the collection and evaluation of
information needed to ensure adequate environmental safeguards.
First, the large size of the planning areas makes detailed environ-
mental analysis impractical 285 Second, the DOI will be unable to
delete particularly sensitive tracts, because tract-specific information
will be unavailable. General information for whole planning areas
will not assist in determining the need for tract-specific lease stipula-
tions. Third, the areawide EIS procedures will place an increased
burden on special interest groups to gather information for tract de-
letions and lease stipulations. This responsibility belongs to the DOI
as trustee of the public lands. 286 Moreover, there will be only a
forty-five day public comment period for the areawide EIS.287
D. Funding for Ocean and Coastal Programs
In fiscal year 1982, at the same time DOI was vastly accelerating
OCS oil and gas leasing, 288 the Reagan Administration proposed the
elimination of federal funding for state implementation of the
Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Program, the Coastal Energy Im-
pact (CEI) Program, and The National Sea Grant (NSG) Program.
be StoppedZ 20 URB. L. ANN. 197 (1980). For a case holding that site-specific re-
ports are unnecessary where the DOI has been reasonably diligent in preparing
broader impact statements, see Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (D.C.
Cal. 1979).
283. House Hearings -Part 1, supra note 281, at 34.
284. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 27; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28
(1983). One reason the DOI has encouraged the tiering of environmental impact
statements is to save money. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 27.
It costs the Department of the Interior five million dollars to produce an impact
statement for an OCS sale, and the Department wants to reduce this expenditure.
House Hearings - Part 2, supra note 235, at 5.
285. House Hearings - Part 2, supra note 235, at 254 (statements of Frances
Beinecke, Senior Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
286. Id at 257-58.
287. The draft environmental impact statement is available for public comment
according to existing CEQ regulations for 45 days. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1983).
The DOI does not propose to change it to allow more time for public comment.
House Hearings - Part 2 supra note 235, at 169.
288. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 36 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
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This funding provides grants and loans to mitigate the adverse im-
pact of coastal energy development.28 9
The Reagan Administration attempted to justify the proposed
budget cuts on several grounds. First, the Administration argued
that federal CZM assistance has largely fulfilled its intended purpose
- to help states develop and implement CZM programs - with
twenty-five approved state programs covering seventy-eight percent
of the coastline. Thus, states should now be expected to fund fully
the program that manages their coastal zones. Second, since many
of the state CZM programs have been in existence for several years
and are an integral part of their overall environmental protection
activities, they are unlikely to be abandoned because of the with-
drawal of federal funding.290 Third, economic growth resulting from
energy resource development on federal lands - either onshore or
offshore - should create new tax bases which, in the long run, com-
pensate for associated impacts. Fourth, the federal government still
provides funding for community facilities and services through a
wide variety of categorical and block grant programs - for instance,
community development and sewage treatment plant construction
grants from the Environmental Protection Agency. States and their
political subdivisions have the opportunity to target these sources of
assistance to areas experiencing the impact of energy development.
Fifth, many port facilities are currently underutilized due to declines
in various coastal industrial activities. The existence of this un-
derutilized capacity makes the occurrence of the type of boomtown
activity that was a concern behind the CEI Program unlikely.29 Fi-
nally, the Administration considered further funding inappropriate
when balanced against the need to reduce the federal budget deficit
and taxes.292
The proposed budget cuts would have effectively terminated the
only national programs for comprehensive coastal management and
protection. Withdrawal of federal funds would have caused the ter-
mination or limitation of state coastal programs293 and significantly
289. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 146.
290. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 36.
291. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 29 (statement of W.
Kenneth Davis, Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Energy).
292. Id The elimination of the Coastal Zone Management Program will save
the federal government approximately 179 million dollars through 1986. The termi-
nation of the Coastal Energy Impact Program will save 158 million dollars from the
federal budget through 1986. Oceanography Miscellaneous - Part 1: Hearings on
Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 445-46
(1981) (statement of James Walsh, Acting Administrator, National Oceanic &
Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts].
293. S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1983).
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impaired the ability of state and local governments to plan for and
ameliorate the adverse impacts of OCS oil and gas development.2 94
In a survey of its member states, the Coastal States Organization
concluded that the termination of federal funding would destroy or
seriously impair eighty percent of existing state CZM programs.2 95
"The result will be that the existing statutory review responsibilities
and procedures for OCS and other coastal-related development ac-
tivities would be seriously diminished, affecting the rate at which
permits could be issued. ' 296 This would in turn affect the rate at
which energy development projects could proceed.
There are at least seven reasons why the federal government
should fund national coastal programs. First, the coast is a national
resource. Coastal facilities and marine environments serve people
throughout the nation, not just local residents.297 Moreover, the
coastal zone contains some of the most biologically productive areas
in the country.298 Second, the CZM Program is the only national
program that comprehensively deals with the management of coastal
resources. 299 Third, the CZM Program establishes a management
framework that can deal with contemporary coastal development
problems.30 Fourth, if CZM programs are discontinued now, it will
cost millions of dollars to re-establish them in the future.30 1 Coastal
states will have lost members of the staff that have developed an
expertise in coastal issues.302 Fifth, with the acceleration of OCS
294. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 36 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
295. Hearings on Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts, supra note 292, at 524
(statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.).
296. S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983).
297. Hearings on Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts, supra note 292, at 483
(statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Society); see also id at 513
(statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.).
298. Id at 513 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., Chairperson, Coast Alliance).
299. Id at 514 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Att'y, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., Chairperson, Coast Alliance).
300. Id at 484 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Society).
The CZMA has proved to be a flexible law that can handle changing problems. For
example, in 1976 the CZMA was used to deal with the concerns of state and local
governments about the adverse impacts from OCS oil and gas development. It was
utilized in 1978 to provide funds to renew the urban waterfront for recreation and
tourism. Thus, in the past the management capability of CZM has been used to
address new problems efficiently. If retained, this management capability could be
expanded to address future problems. If it is not retained, the nation will have to
pay for an entire new management framework sometime in the future. Id
301. Id at 485 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Society).
302. S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983).
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leasing, a resource management program is even more essential for
the protection of the marine environment. Sixth, it is unreasonable
for the federal government to accelerate OCS leasing, yet fail to pro-
vide coastal states with funds to deal with the impacts of accelerated
leasing. The burden of supporting accelerated OCS development
should not be placed upon coastal states that have limited opportuni-
ties to recover associated impact costs. Finally, CZM programs are
cost effective. The yearly budget for the CZM Program is only
thirty-seven million dollars. This is a small price to pay for a com-
prehensive national program of coastal resource management. 30 3
The elimination of the CZM and CEI Programs would severely
limit the opportunity for meaningful participation by coastal states
in the OCS decisionmaking process. Coastal states barred from such
participation may turn increasingly to litigation to challenge individ-
ual lease sales. The DOI's attempt to accelerate OCS development
may suffer major delays from such litigation.3°4 Moreover, limiting
coastal state participation in OCS policymaking violates the provi-
sions of the OCSLA and the Congressional intent behind it. One
purpose of the OCSLA is to involve coastal states and local govern-
ments in policy planning for OCS oil and gas development. 30 5 The
OCSLA itself acknowledges that offshore energy development may
cause adverse impacts on coastal states and local governments.30 6
Therefore, coastal states and local governments are to be provided
with comprehensive assistance to anticipate and ameliorate the ad-
verse impacts of OCS oil and gas development. Such assistance
must include timely access to information, an opportunity to partici-
pate in the formulation of policy and planning decisions, and an op-
portunity to review and comment on final decisions. 307
303. Id
304. PITFALLS, supra note 227, at 48-49; see also S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 12 (1983).
305. The House report on the OCSLA Amendments states:
A major purpose. . . is to involve the states and affected local areas within
the States in the entire exploitation process to a greater degree. The bill
provides an opportunity for them to participate in the decisionmaking pro-
cess with regard to the overall leasing program of the Secretary, and indi-
vidual development and production plans of the oil companies. The States
and local areas are also supplied with information so that they will be able
to plan for and ameliorate the on-shore consequences of off-shore develop-
ment, and with assistance in coping with the on-shore impacts of such de-
velopment. Involving States in the process from the beginning should
avoid time-consuming lawsuits later.
H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1450, 1457.
306. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332(4), 1801(10) (1982).
307. Id §§ 1332(4), 1801(11), 1802(4)-(6).
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A strong system of coastal management and energy impact pro-
grams would benefit accelerated OCS development rather than deter
it. The termination of federal financial support for the CZM and
CEI Programs would constitute "monumental bad faith on the part
of the [Reagan Administration] and a continuation of the very short-
sighted, arrogant and negative approach of the Department of the
Interior."308
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States oil supply has become increasingly endan-
gered by turmoil in the Middle East - the assassination of Egypt's
President Sadat, the Iran-Iraq war, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the
emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, and the heightening confron-
tation between Israel and the Palestinians. In the face of this insta-
bility, the United States has resolved to pursue every available
avenue to reduce dependence on Middle East oil. One such avenue
is to increase significantly domestic offshore exploration and
production.309
The drive toward domestic energy self-reliance promises to se-
verely test federal-state relations, particularly in Alaska, where fed-
eral ownership and control of energy resources is pervasive.310
While the state wishes to contribute to national energy self-suffi-
ciency,311 Alaskans fear that their interests are in danger of being
sacrificed for the sake of short-term national energy goals which are
being set by federal officials.312 The state's frustration over federal
308. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 1, supra note 4, at 285 (statement of
Michael Fischer, Executive Director, California Coastal Commission).
309. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 50 (statement of James
G. Watt, Sec'y of Interior).
310. Rogers, Alaska - The Federally Owned State, in ALASKA PUBLIC POLICY:
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 121 (G. Harrison ed. 1973).
The federal government owns 89% of Alaska. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1980 PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 9 (1980). "The
federal government owns 1,152,586 square miles or 32.5% of the U.S. continental
area of 3,549,002 square miles. About 40% of these federal lands are in Alaska -
some 512,000 out of the state's total of 589,757 square miles." ALASKA STATEHOOD
COMMISSION, MORE PERFECT UNION: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 20 (Jan. 19, 1982).
311. The state of Alaska has made and is willing to continue to make significant
contributions to the nation's energy supply. The state supported the construction of
the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez and lobbied unsuccess-
fully for the construction of an all Alaska natural gas pipeline.
However, the accelerated OCS leasing, when combined with probable federal
onshore leasing and the state's own leasing program, places a significant burden on
the state of Alaska and its residents. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note
10, at 457 (letter from Governor Hammond to Secretary Watt).
312. OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program: Hearings on the Proposed Five- Year
OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program Before the Subcomm. on Energy Resources and
Materials Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th
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intrusion 313 has reached a point where secession - unilateral with-
drawal of Alaska from the United States - has been advocated by
some,314 and a growing "Tundra Rebellion" movement has emerged
seeking state control of federal land. A Tundra Rebellion petition,
asserting that Alaska has a legal claim to federal land within its bor-
ders, gathered enough signatures to place it on the state ballot.315
While the federal policy enunciated by Secretary Watt316 has
promise, issues involving exploitation of the Alaska OCS will test the
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980) (statement of Jay Hammond, Governor, State of Alaska)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on OCS Leasing Program].
313. One of the most significant controversies between Alaska and the federal
government over resource policy and land management in the state was the "d-2"
issue. On December 2, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982). The
Act set aside over 106 million acres of the public land in Alaska in various federal
conservation-system units. The ANILCA debate was referred to as the "d-2" issue
because ANILCA's formal history began with section 17(d)(2) of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982).
Section 17(d)(2) of ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw
80 million acres of unreserved public lands in Alaska suitable for addition to or
creation as units of the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and Wild and Scenic
Rivers system. When Congress failed to reach agreement on the scope of the with-
drawals, President Carter and Secretary Andrus issued a series of controversial ex-
ecutive withdrawals in 1978. Purporting to act under the emergency provisions of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1982), Interior Secretary Andrus withdrew 110 million acres of public land in
Alaska for three years and an additional 11 million acres of national forest lands for
two years. Id § 1714(e). President Carter, purporting to act pursuant to the Ameri-
can Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1906), withdrew 56 million acres of public
lands in Alaska for designation as national monuments. Court challenges to these
withdrawals failed. See Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
These executive withdrawals infuriated the majority of Alaskans who com-
plained about the federal lockup of their natural resources. From their perspective,
the executive actions were undertaken to appease the larger national interest against
the welfare of the local residents. Cravez, The Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act: Directing the Great Land's Future, 10 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 33
(1980); Comment, The Alaskan National Monuments of 1978.Another Chapter in the
Great Alaskan Land War, 8 ENVTL. AFF. 59 (1979).
314. ALASKA STATEHOOD COMMISSION, MORE PERFECT UNION: A PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT 31-40 (Jan. 19, 1982); see also W. Alaska OCS Development Tiff Seen,
OIL & GAS J., Feb. 8, 1982, at 214.
315. ALASKA STATEHOOD COMMISSION, MORE PERFECT UNION: A PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT 20-23 (Jan. 19, 1982).
The Tundra Rebellion initiative, spinoff of the Nevada-born Sagebrush Rebel-
lion, claimed for Alaska title to all unappropriated federal land in the state. The
initiative was approved by 113,061 votes to 42,429. Anchorage Times, Nov. 3, 1982,
at 1, col. 1. The Tundra Rebellion is a response in part, to the "outrageous lockups
of huge areas of Alaska by the Carter administration." Nichols, Voters Send a
Message to Washington on Lands, Anchorage Times, Nov. 3, 1982, at D2, col. 1.
316. 127 CONG. REc. 54,588 (daily ed. May 7, 1981) (statement of James G.
Watt, Sec'y of the Interior).
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federal government's commitment to its rhetoric.317 The Alaska
OCS is one of the most promising frontier offshore areas for petro-
leum development in the world,318 but oil development there will not
add revenues to the state's treasury. OCS leasing is a federal pro-
gram over which Alaska and other coastal states have little formal
decisionmaking authority, and from which they receive no revenue.
All money generated from federal OCS leasing will go either to the
federal government or to the oil companies.319 Alaska, however, will
bear the impact of development on its fisheries and wildlife, its re-
mote towns and villages, and on its economy and society.3 20
Thus, although Alaska is not opposed to the development of
federal energy resources within or about its borders, it does want to
be guaranteed a meaningful opportunity to participate in federal
decisionmaking to be sure that its concerns about OCS oil and gas
development within adjacent coastal waters will be seriously ad-
dressed.321 The controversy over OCS leasing will heighten in the
near future as the federal government, seeking to promote energy
self-sufficiency, accelerates the OCS program. In order to reduce
tension and develop a workable mechanism to accommodate all par-
ties' interests, the following recommendations are offered.
A. The Criteria for Leasing Alaska's OCS Areas
1. The OCS areas adjacent to currently producing oil fields
should be leased first to reduce the need for new facilities. Offshore
leasing should expand outward from these areas as the necessary
technology and infrastructure are developed. Similarly, repeated
sales should be held in areas with high interest that have previously
been offered for lease before areas of low interest are offered.
2. The OCS areas with low natural hazards should be leased
first to decrease the likelihood of oil spills.
3. The OCS areas with the lowest biological productivity and
the least vulnerability to disruptions from offshore oil and gas devel-
opment should be leased first. Conversely, OCS leasing should not
proceed in areas with important renewable resources or critical
habitat until mitigating measures are implemented.
317. House Hearings - Part 2, supra note 235, at 54.
318. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release
(July 21, 1982).
319. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(m) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 89,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1496.
320. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1768, 1780-83.
321. Senate Hearings on OCS Leasing Program, supra note 312, at 21-25 (state-
ment of Jay Hammond, Governor, State of Alaska).
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4. The OCS areas with the lowest commercial, subsistence,
and recreational use should be leased first.
5. No OCS area should be leased unless the technology exists
to clean up a major oil spill or divert it from environmentally sensi-
tive onshore areas.
6. The resource values and uses of adjacent state lands should
be considered in evaluating the suitability of offering OCS areas for
lease.322
B. Categories of Lease Areas in Alaska
Federal leasing of Alaska's OCS should proceed based upon
three categories of lease areas:
1. Areas which may be leased today because proven technol-
ogy for offshore oil and gas development currently exists and the
necessary infrastructure is already established as a result of previous
petroleum development activity. They include the near-shore
Beaufort Sea, the eastern Gulf of Alaska, the lower Cook Inlet, and
the upper Sheilikof Strait.
2. Areas in which OCS leasing may be appropriate during the
latter part of the 1982-1987 period, pursuant to the criteria described
in Part A of this proposal. These include the Navarin Basin, the
Norton Basin, and the Kodiak Shelf. Sufficient time must be al-
lowed in these areas for the completion of district coastal manage-
ment plans and for further progress in developing exploration
techniques, transportation, and measures designed to mitigate ad-
verse impacts.
3. Areas in which leasing should be postponed until there is a
comprehensive environmental data base for use in developing regu-
latory guidelines and a complete coastal management plan. These
areas include the Chukchi Sea, the North Aleutian Shelf, the St.
George Basin, and the transition and offshore pack ice zones of the
Beaufort Sea.323
322. Id at 23.
323. Id at 23-24; Figure 2 indicates some of the major areas comprising Alaska's
coast.
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C. Expansion of Oil and Gas Exploration Opportunities
1. Federal Onshore Lands. Federal oil and gas development in
Alaska should be pursued not only in the federal OCS, but also on
federal onshore land, much of which has a higher petroleum poten-
tial than some offshore areas currently scheduled for lease.324 Al-
though Alaska has been identified as having the highest potential in
the United States for onshore hydrocarbon reserves, there has been
no new federal onshore leasing in Alaska since 1965.325
There is a fundamental inconsistency in a federal policy which
calls for the leasing of remote and sensitive OCS areas such as the
Chukchi Sea, the North Aleutian Shelf, and the St. George Basin,
while foreclosing the exploration of onshore areas such as the Arctic
Wildlife Range.326 Moreover, there is no justification for being less
cautious in hazardous marine environments than in federal onshore
areas in Alaska.327 The onshore areas have a higher resource poten-
tial, and they could be developed more quickly and economically
with known technology. In addition, development of these areas
presents fewer environmental hazards than does development of
Alaska's OCS.328
2. State Lands. Domestic production of petroleum resources
from Alaska should come not only from federal lands but also from
state lands that may have higher hydrocarbon potential than some of
Alaska's federal OCS lease areas. Alaska has an active five-year off-
shore leasing plan of its own. However, the state's ability to accom-
modate rapid social and economic change is not unlimited. The
burden of the current federal OCS leasing schedule may force
Alaska to reduce its own offshore leasing schedule, with a resulting
net loss of domestic oil and gas production.329
D. Revenue Sharing
The federal government should share OCS leasing revenues
with coastal states. The revenues from OCS leasing should be dis-
tributed based upon an equitable formula that takes into account
OCS activity, other coastal energy activities, state coastline length
324. Id at 21.
325. Id at 2 (statement of Senator Ted Stevens).
326. Id at 21 (statement of Jay Hammond, Governor, State of Alaska). The
Arctic Wildlife Range has been ranked as the most promising onshore area in the
United States for the discovery of oil and gas resources. The petroleum potential of
the Arctic Wildlife Range is estimated to be in the range of another Prudhoe Bay
field. Id at 2 (statement of Senator Ted Stevens).
327. Id at 25 (statement of Jay Hammond, Governor, State of Alaska).
328. Id at 22.
329. Id
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and population, and a completed, federally-approved state coastal
management program. Funds from OCS receipts should go toward
coastal management and should not be used for unrelated state or
local programs.330
The Reagan Administration opposes revenue sharing as incon-
sistent with its policy of fiscal restraint.33' Revenue sharing is rea-
sonable, however, since the revenue generated by federal lease sales
may greatly increase under a carefully administered accelerated leas-
ing program. Furthermore, coastal states provide onshore facilities
and services which make federal leases marketable and which make
offshore petroleum development possible.332 Finally, as recognized
in the establishment of the CEI Program, there is a serious inequity
in the treatment of coastal and inland energy-producing states. In-
land states receive fifty percent of all royalties paid to the federal
government for energy activity on federal lands within state borders.
By contrast, coastal states receive no revenue directly from federal
OCS oil and gas development. The Congressional Research Service
estimated that in the period from 1981 through 1984, coastal states'
share of royalties from OCS leasing activity would average more
than three billion dollars annually. Federal assistance actually re-
ceived by coastal states through the CZM and CEI Programs during
the same period, however, amounted to less than three percent of
that amount.333
E. Federal-State Cooperation
There should be established, either administratively or legisla-
tively, an Alaska OCS Advisory Council, patterned after the Alaska
Land Use Council.334 The Council should be headed by a federal
representative to be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and a state representative to be appointed by
the Governor of Alaska.335 Additional council members should in-
clude: (1) the heads of the Alaska offices of the National Park Ser-
vice, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of
330. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 3, supra note 23, at 184 (statement of John
R. Weingart, Deputy Director, Division of Coastal Resources, State of New Jersey,
on behalf of the Coastal States Organization).
331. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 120 (statement of Wil-
liam Matuszeski, Acting Ass't Administrator, Office of Coastal Zone Management,
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce); see also id at
131.
332. Id at 65 (statement of William P. Clements, Governor, State of Texas).
333. Hearings on Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts, supra note 292, at 442.
334. See 16 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982); Senate Hearings on OCS Leasing Program,
supra note 312, at 30.
335. See 16 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (1982).
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Land Management, the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Ser-
vice, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the
Department of Transportation; (2) the Commissioners of the Alaska
Departments of Natural Resources, Fish and Game, Environmental
Conservation, and Transportation; (3) four representatives selected
by the Alaska Native Regional Corporations from the twelve geo-
graphic regions; and (4) four representatives selected by the Gover-
nor of Alaska from the public at large.336
The Council should conduct studies on coastal zone issues, and
advise the Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of Alaska with
respect to ongoing, planned, and proposed OCS development activi-
ties. The Council should make specific recommendations with re-
spect to the following: (1) proposed regulations promulgated by the
United States under the OCSLA; (2) improved coordination and
consultation between the federal government and the state of
Alaska; (3) ways to insure that OCS oil and gas development is com-
patible with both federal and state economic, social, and environ-
mental objectives; and (4) changes in laws, policies, and programs
relating to OCS petroleum development. 337
The proposed Advisory Council would supplement and not re-
place the provisions of the OCSLA that regulate state participation
in the OCS leasing program. 338 It would provide an informal forum
for the discussion of issues relevant to the development of Alaska's
OCS hydrocarbon resources, including an opportunity for direct
336. See id § 3181(c).
337. See id § 3181(i).
338. State participation at the leasing program stage is regulated by three sec-
tions of the OCSLA Amendments. First, one of the factors the Secretary of the
Interior must consider and on which he must base the timing and location of OCS
lease sales is the "laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifi-
cally identified by the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secre-
tary's consideration." 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(F) (1982). Second, the Secretary is
required to "invite and consider suggestions" on the proposed leasing program from
the governors of any affected states. Id § 1344(c)(1). Finally, after the Secretary
has designed the proposed leasing program, he must submit it to the governors of
affected states for review and comment at least 60 days before the proposed program
is published in the Federal Register. Id § 1344(c)(2).
Statutory requirements for state participation in OCS decisionmaking continue
at the lease sale stage. The OCSLA Amendments permit a governor of an affected
state to submit recommendations to the Secretary regarding the size, timing, and
location of a proposed lease sale. Id § 1345(a). These recommendations must be
submitted within 60 days after the notice of sale. Id § 1345(b). The Secretary must
consult with the governor, and must accept the recommendation if he determines
that it provides a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-
being of the citizens of the affected states. Id § 1345(c). This provision applies only
to individual lease sales and not to development of the leasing program.
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public participation in the OCS decisionmaking process.339 It would
not, however, provide coastal states with a veto power in the deci-
sionmaking process.34
339. For discussions on public participation in natural resource decisionmaking,
see Achterman & Fairfax, The Public Participation Requirements ofthe Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 21 ARiz. L. REV. 501 (1979); Ashbaugh & Sorensen,
Identifying the "Public"for Particiation in Coastal Zone Management, 2 COASTAL
ZONE MGMT. J. 383 (1976); Robadue & Tippie, Public Involvement in Offshore Oil
Development.- Lessons From New England, 7 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 237 (1980);
Sewell & O'Riordan, The Culture of Particioation In Environmental Decisionmaking,
16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1976); Shabman, Toward Effective Public Partictadon In
Coastal Zone Management, 1 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 197 (1974).
340. Granting final veto power to coastal states would defeat the purposes of the
OCSLA. Congress did not intend to give states veto authority over the OCS leasing
program. H.R. REP. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1450, 1559. Courts have held that the OCSLA Amendments
did not grant final veto power over OCS activities to the states. See California v.
Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1982); California v. Secretary of the Interior,
104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
Although coastal states should have maximum involvement in the OCS deci-
sionmaking process, they cannot run the OCS program. At times, the greater na-
tional interest overrides the interest of a single state. OCS Oversight Hearings -
Part 2, supra note 10, at 109. For illustration, California has adopted a policy which
would allow OCS oil and gas development along less than 15% of its extensive
coastline. House Hearings - Part 1, supra note 281, at 72.
Coastal states do not need veto power over OCS oil and gas activities or greater
statutory authority for OCS decisionmaking to protect their interests. Increased co-
ordination and cooperation between the federal government, particularly the DOI,
and coastal states would yield decisions protecting all interests involved. The DOI
must do more than perform the bare minimum required by the OCSLA to regulate
state participation in OCS decisionmaking. The Secretary must cooperate with
coastal states not only to the extent required by the letter of the law but also in the
spirit of the OCSLA as well.
Secretary Watt, however, fostered an atmosphere of confrontation with the
coastal states that has delayed expedited leasing of the OCS. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 42, 47-48. His policy of brinksmanship in dealing with the coastal states
generated litigation on the leasing and unnecessarily slowed the development of
OCS petroleum resources. Id at 44, 46. As Michael Fischer, Director of the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, stated in congressional testimony:
[W]e (the State of California) find ourselves fighting with Interior every
step of the way. Instead of working in a partnership, we are antagonists
and frankly we think that the support that we have had on the Hill and in
Congress is a direct reflection of the fact that that is not your intent. Your
intent is that States and Interior work together in the national interest. We
- that is to say the State of California and our local governments, have
literally wasted millions of dollars in time and money attempting to coop-
erate and coordinate with the Department of the Interior, finding ourselves
instead required to go to the Hill and to go to the court to win our battles,
and we have won every one of them.
House Hearings - Part 1, supra note 281, at 6 (statement of Michael L. Fischer,
Executive Director, California Coastal Commission).
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Accelerated development of Alaska's OCS is important to
satisfy the energy needs of the United States, but the cost of an accel-
erated program should not fall disproportionately upon Alaska. De-
velopment should not proceed without adequate state input. While
the leasing criteria recommended here will not eliminate the risk of
harm to Alaska's environment and society, they will allow Alaska to
be better prepared for each stage of development, thereby assuring
that the costs of accelerated OCS leasing will not outweigh the bene-
fits to be obtained. The proposed Alaska OCS Advisory Council
will provide a forum to assifre that state concerns are not disregarded
within the scheme of federal ownership and control. Careful plan-
ning and meaningful state involvement are essential to the proper
execution of an accelerated leasing program because the harmful ef-
fects of reckless OCS development may be far-reaching, costly, and
irreparable.
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APPENDIX
OCS CHARACTERISTICS AND PETROLEUM RESERVES
The seabed is divided into four geological areas: the continental
shelf, the continental slope, the continental rise, and the abyssal
plain or deep seabed. The shelf, slope, and rise form the continental
margin.341 The continental shelf is the submerged extension of the
continental land mass. It begins immediately adjacent to the shore-
line and extends into the ocean for a distance ranging from nearly
zero to more than eight hundred miles.34 2 The average depth of the
continental shelf is 130 meters, and its average width is forty miles.
At its edge, the continental shelf drops off steeply, forming the conti-
nental slope. The slope continues to a depth of 1400 to 3200 meters,
where the gradient decreases significantly, marking the start of the
continental rise. The rise gradually slopes off to merge with the
341. Franssen, Oil and Gas in the Oceans, 61 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD.
388, 389 (1980); see Figure 3 for a graphic representation of the continental margin
and deep seabed.
342. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, 53 U.S. NAVAL
WAR C. INT'L STUD. 12, 17 (1961). The world's continental shelves vary greatly in
width. Id. at 17. "[O]ff the coast of Chile, Corsica and Southeastern France, the
shelf is non-existent; the sea-floor descends almost immediately to the abyssal
depths. In other areas, the continental shelf extends for hundreds of miles." Com-
ment, The Interaction of Law and Technology: The Continental Shelf Problem, 1
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49, 53 (1968).
The term "continental shelf' was first used as a geological term by Hugh Rob-
ert Mill in 1887. Hounshell & Kemp, The Continental Shelf A Study in National
Interest and International Law, 5 J. PUB. L. 343, 344 (1956). For discussions on
attempts to define the continental shelf, see Franklin, supra, at 12-30; Gutteridge,
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 102,
106-10 (1959); Comment, Method and Basis of Seaward Delimitation of Continental
Shelf Jurisdiction, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 110-17 (1976); Comment, Relation of Polit-
ical Boundaries on the Ocean Roor to the Continental Margin, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 57,
58-60 (1976).
The continental shelves represent about 7.5% of the total ocean, an area of ap-
proximately 10 million square miles, roughly the area of Europe plus South
America. Emery, The Continental Shelves, Sci. AM., Sept. 1969, at 106, 108; see also
Franklin, supra, at 14.
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deep seabed at approximately 4000 meters.343 The OCS is com-
monly defined to include those areas between the depths of two hun-
dred and 2500 meters.344
Of the four areas of the seabed, the continental shelf is believed
to contain the most commercially exploitable resources because the
thick sedimentation there traps migrating oil and gas. Fifty-five to
seventy percent of the world's offshore petroleum resources are esti-
mated to lie in depths of less than two hundred meters. Further-
more, most of these resources are expected to lie within two hundred
nautical miles of the shore. Only two percent of all offshore petro-
leum resources are estimated to lie in the deep ocean beyond the
continental shelf.345
Offshore oil and gas production represented only ten percent of
domestic oil production and twenty-five percent of domestic natural
gas production in 1982.346 Nevertheless, the United States OCS can
be the "largest domestic source of oil and gas between now and the
1990's.1 347 According to the United States Geological Survey
343. See generally Campbell, The Continental Shelf, MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA 52, 53-56 (D. Larson ed. 1976); Orlin, Offshore Boundaries: Engineering
and Economic Aspects, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 87, 88-89 (1975).
For further discussion of continental shelf geology, see Alvarez, Strategic Impli-
cations of Continental Shelves, 61 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L STUD. 404-24 (1980);
Creager, Coastlines and Continental Shelves: Geological History and Characteristics,
OCEAN RESOURCES & PUB. PoL'Y 25 (T. English ed. 1973); Emery, Geological Lim-
its of the Continental Shelf, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. I (1981); Knight, The Draft
United Nations Conventions on the International SeabedArea: Background, Descrio-
tion, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459 (1971); Swing, Who
Will Own the Oceans, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 527, 528-30 (1976); Comment, Continental
Shelf Law: Outdistanced by Science and Technology, 31 LA. L. REV. 108 (1970).
For a discussion of the geology and formation of the global oceans, see Bullard,
The Origin of the Oceans, SCI. AM., Sept. 1969, at 66; Menard, The Deep-Ocean
Floor, SCI. AM., Sept. 1969, at 126; Revelle, The Ocean, ScI. AM., Sept. 1969, at 54.
344. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 4, at 2.
345. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, OCEAN PETROLEUM RESOURCES 16-17
(1975).
346. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE
FACTS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING
PROGRAM 2 (July 1983).
347. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1481.
Marine geologists estimate that the ultimate recoverable yield of oil and gas
from the oceans is at least equal to, and probably greater than, that of onshore
petroleum reserves. Frannsen, supra note 341, at 388. Thus, by 1990, the petroleum
industry expects worldwide offshore production to double to 24 billion barrels per
day. In 1980, annual expenditures by the offshore industry on exploration and pro-
duction were five times those in 1970. In the next decade, the offshore industry
expects its expenditures to increase from the current level of $20 billion to about $50
billion annually. Crawford & Grimes, Experts Probe Business in the 8o's, OFF-
SHORE, Apr. 1981, at 87, 88.
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(USGS), up to sixty percent of the nation's undiscovered oil and gas
resources are in the OCS area.348 The USGS estimates that the
United States OCS contains recoverable resources of seventeen to
forty-four billion barrels of oil and 117 to 231 trillion cubic feet of
gas. The average estimate of the energy resource potential of the
United States OCS is twenty-eight billion barrels of oil and 167 tril-
lion cubic feet of gas, as compared with onshore potential of fifty-
five billion barrels of oil and 427 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.349
348. OCS Oversight Hearings - Part 2, supra note 10, at 215-16 (statement of
Congressman Edwin Forsythe).
349. U.S. G.S. Boosts Estimate of Undiscovered Gas, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 9, 1981,
at 48. For an extensive analysis of oil and gas statistics by country, including esti-
mated proved reserves, onshore and offshore production, and refining capacity see
Enright, World Oil Flow Dives, Reserves Climb, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 83;
Worldwide Production, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 99.
Petroleum resources are divided into three basic groups: proved resources, sup-
plementary resources, and undiscovered potential resources. "Proved resources are
those which geologic engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be
recoverable from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating condi-
tions." Frannsen, supra note 341, at 390. Supplementary resources is the remaining
estimated petroleum in known reservoirs that may be recovered with the use of
improved secondary and tertiary techniques. Estimates of undiscovered potential
resources are based upon a given area's potential as compared to productive oil
fields with similar geological characteristics. Id
Great uncertainties exist as to estimates of oil and gas resources in various areas
of the United States and the world. Secretary Watt believes the accelerated leasing
schedule is justified "because the precise quantities and locations of oil and gas in
frontier areas are presently unknown." The Secretary explained that "current esti-
mates are really not much better than best guesses and we can't improve on them
until there has been exploratory drilling." U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of the
Secretary, News Release (July 15, 1981). For illustration, in 1891 the United States
Geological Survey declared that there was "little or no chance of oil in Kansas or
Texas." Moreover, the DOI predicted in 1939 that United States oil supplies would
last only thirteen years, and in 1949 Interior warned that the "end of the United
States oil supply is almost in sight." Sheets & Benham, Oil Fever Rages- And So
Does an Old Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 4, 1981, at 49, 51.
For discussions evaluating the energy production potential of the United States
OCS, see F. BECK & K. WIIG, THE ECONOMICS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SuP-
PLIES (1977); Prato & Miller, Evaluating the Energy Production Potential of the
United States Outer Continental Shelf, 57 LAND ECON., Feb. 1981, at 77. For a dis-
cussion on petroleum formation within the continental shelf, see R. ECKERT, THE
ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 90-99.
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